

RAYMOND GREW, <i>Editor</i>	History	University of Michigan
ARAM A. YENGÖYAN, <i>Associate Editor</i>	Anthropology	University of California, Davis

BOOK REVIEW EDITORS

JULIA ADAMS	Sociology	University of Michigan
NICHOLAS B. DIRKS	Anthropology and History	University of Michigan
DIANE OWEN HUGHES	History	University of Michigan

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

JOHN D'ARMS	Classics and History	University of Michigan
GEOFF ELEY	History	University of Michigan
ALBERT FEUERWERKER	East Asian History	University of Michigan
JACK GOODY	Anthropology	University of Cambridge
WILLIAM I. MILLER	Law	University of Michigan
SONYA O. ROSE	History and Sociology	University of Michigan
THOMAS R. TRAUTMANN	South Asian History	University of Michigan
JAMES TURNER	History	University of Michigan

CONSULTING EDITORS

LEONARD BARKAN	English and History of Art	New York University
BERNARD S. COHN	Anthropology and History	University of Chicago
NATALIE Z. DAVIS	History	Princeton University
S. N. EISENSTADT	Sociology	Hebrew University, Jerusalem
NANCY FARRISS	History	University of Pennsylvania
CLIFFORD GEERTZ	Anthropology	Institute for Advanced Study
CARLO GINZBURG	History	Università degli Studi di Bologna

MAURICE GODELIER	Anthropology	CNRS
GEOFFREY HAWTHORN	Sociology	University of Cambridge
DAVID A. HOLLINGER	History	University of California, Berkeley

KEITH HOPKINS	Sociology	University of Cambridge
EMMANUEL LE ROY LADURIE	History	Collège de France
SHERRY B. ORTNER	Anthropology	University of California, Berkeley

JACOB M. PRICE	Economic History	University of Michigan
RICHARD RORTY	English and Philosophy	University of Virginia
JAMES SCOTT	Political Science	Yale University
TEODOR SHANIN	Sociology	University of Manchester
SUSAN R. SULEIMAN	Romance Languages	Harvard University
CHARLES TILLY	Sociology and History	New School for Social Research
KATHERINE M. VERDERY	Anthropology	Johns Hopkins University
MICHAEL WALZER	Political Theory	Institute for Advanced Study
ERIC R. WOLF	Anthropology	Lehman College, CUNY
GAVIN WRIGHT	Economics	Stanford University

Editorial Office: 102 Rackham Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1070, U.S.A.
James T. Schaefer, Senior Editor.

Publishing, Subscription, and Advertising Offices: Cambridge University Press, 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011, U.S.A.; or Cambridge University Press, The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU, England.

Published Quarterly. Annual subscription rates for Volume 36, 1994: Institutional, US \$80.00 in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico, UK £57.00 in all other countries; Individual, US \$35.00 in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico, UK £25.00 in all other countries. Student rate: US \$20.00 in the U.S.A. and Canada only. Prices include postage and insurance; airmail outside the U.S.A. and Canada, £16.50 per year extra.

Copyright © 1994 Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, electronic, photocopying or

Haitians, Magic, and Money: *Raza* and Society in the Haitian–Dominican Borderlands, 1900 to 1937

LAUREN DERBY

University of Chicago

Sitting on the banks of the shallow riverine waters separating the northern border towns of Dajabón of the Dominican Republic and Ouanaminthe of Haiti, one can see children wade, market women wash, and people pass from one nation to another. They are apparently impervious to the official meaning of this river as a national boundary that rigidly separates these two contiguous Caribbean island nations. Just as the water flows, so do people, goods, and merchandise between the two countries, even as the Dominican border guards stationed on a small mound above the river watch. The ironies of history lie here, as well as the poetics of its remembrance. This river is called *El Masacre*, a name which recalls the 1937 Haitian massacre, when the water is said to have run scarlet red from the blood of thousands of Haitians killed by machetes there by soldiers under the direction of the Dominican dictator, Rafael M. Trujillo (1930–61).¹

This essay is based on research conducted jointly with Richard Turits and forms part of a larger study of the 1937 Haitian massacre presently being completed. This larger study treats official and popular representations of Haitians, of the massacre, and of the nation in the Dominican Republic, as well as the historical context of Haitian–Dominican relations, and questions of hegemony and violence under the Trujillo regime. Needless to say, many of the ideas presented here were first formulated collectively. Research for this paper was funded by an IIE Fulbright Grant for Collaborative Research (1986–88). I am indebted to Richard Turits, Catherine LeGrand, Julie Franks, Friedrich Katz, Andrew Apter, Raymundo González, Paul Liffman, and Mark Auslander, all of whom contributed careful criticisms and thoughtful suggestions to this essay; Emily Vogt, for her cartographic skills; Ciprián Soler, Sejour Laflor, Edward Jean-Baptiste, and Jean Ghasmann-Bissanthe, who made the interviewing feasible; and Bernard Cohn and Fernando Coronil, whose ideas appear here through osmosis. Drafts of the paper were presented at the Workshop on Social Movements and Popular Ideology in Latin America, the University of Chicago, in May, 1990; the Annual Meetings of the American Anthropology Association in November, 1991; the Foro Dominicano–Haitiano and the Equipo de Investigación Social, Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, both in January, 1993. I am grateful for the many helpful comments I received, especially for those of Raymond Smith and Ann Stoler. This essay is dedicated to those who died in the 1937 Haitian massacre.

¹ The name actually dates from the colonial period, when a labor dispute erupted into a

The following essay examines Haitian identity in the Dominican popular imagination before the 1937 Haitian massacre and interrogates how the transformation of the Dominican frontier into a border in the first decades of the twentieth century changed local meanings of *raza* or race. As the Dominican border became part of the global economy, Haitian-Dominican relations were commodified; and the division between neighbors and blood kin was re-mapped. Haitians came to be seen as the very embodiment of money magic. The transformation of notions of race discussed here helps explain why the massacre made sense in a Gramscian way to border residents, even though the massacre was state sponsored and executed for reasons entirely exterior to the border.² I also analyse how notions of difference were revalorized by the process of state formation, as the 'popular' was redefined as 'public', and efforts were made by the state to order and stratify what had previously been an inclusive and reciprocal frontier. The new regulation of national orifices politicized liminal groups, such as Haitians, now conceived of as social filth. This process introduced hierarchy into a previously horizontal ideology of difference: As frontier Dominicans became part of the nation as citizens, the Haitian community came to be labeled as foreigners threatening the body politic.

As Friedrich Katz has argued for the case of Mexico, the closing of the Dominican frontier signaled both the integration of the region into the national economy and polity, as well as the global economy, and into the arena of domination by the United States (U.S.).³ The Dominican frontier effectively

legendary slaughter of Taino Indians near the river. For the most complete treatment of the 1937 Haitian massacre, see Richard Turits, "Histories of Terror and the Perils of History: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic" (unpublished manuscript, 1989). Other works include: Bernardo Vega, *Trujillo y Haití*, vol. 1 (1930-1937) (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1988); Arthur de Matteis, *Le massacre de 1937 ou un succession immobilière internationale* (Port-au-Prince: Bibliothèque Nationale D'Haiti, 1987); Suzy Castor, *Migración y relaciones internacionales (el caso haitiano-dominicano)* (Santo Domingo: UASD, 1987); José Israel Cuello H., *Documentos del conflicto dominico-haitiano de 1937* (Santo Domingo: Ed. Taller, 1985); Freddy Prestol Castillo, *El masacre se pasa a pie*, 5th ed. (1973; Santo Domingo: Ed. Taller, 1982); Anthony Lespès, *Les semences de la colère* (Port-au-Prince: H. Deschamps, 1949; Editions Fardin, 1983); and Juan Manuel García, *La matanza de los haitianos: Genocidio de Trujillo, 1937* (Santo Domingo: Ed. Alfa y Omega, 1983). For studies in English see Eric Roorda, "Genocide Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy, the Trujillo Regime and the Haitian Massacre of 1937" (Paper presented at Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Charlottesville, VA, 19 June 1993); Thomas Fiehrer, "Political Violence in the Periphery: The Haitian Massacre of 1937," *Race and Class* 32:2 (October-December 1990), 1-20; R. Michael Malek, "The Dominican Republic's General Rafael L. M. Trujillo and the Haitian Massacre of 1937: A Case of Subversion in Inter-Caribbean Relations," *Secolas Annals*, vol. 11 (March 1980), 137-55.

² For more on official anti-Haitianism, see Lauren Derby and Richard Turits, "Historias de terror y los terrores de la historia: la matanza haitiana de 1937 en la República Dominicana," *Estudios Sociales*, 26:92 (April-June 1993), 65-76. Turits confutes the interpretation of the massacre following a straight line from either popular or official anti-Haitianism in his "Histories of Terror and the Perils of History: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic" (Unpublished manuscript, 1989).

³ Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States, and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 5, 7-20.

became a border as a result of the Dominican–American Convention of 1907, a treaty which brought the state into the daily lives of border residents for the first time. The Convention turned over customs collection to the United States. This restricted frontier trade and commodified relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, as authorities sought to siphon off the proceeds of Haitian–Dominican contraband. I examine how this process transformed the meaning of ethnic identity in the border. Dominican notions of *raza* came to be mapped along several contradictory axes, including kinship, ritual, and association with money. Race came to be marked not by skin color, as in the Anglophone world; nor blood genealogy, as in Dominican nationalist discourse; but by an unstable set of symbolic associations linking Haitian *vodoun* (or *vodou*), fertility and value itself. This case demonstrates how the combined process of commodification and nation building can reify difference, endowing people and their products with social power.

In this essay I discuss the notion of *raza*, which in Dominican popular parlance means nation or people and is an external system of classification most commonly used at the border to distinguish Dominicans from Haitians.⁴ I focus here on the play between the tacit knowledge of the Other embodied in kinship and economic practices and in the poetics of difference. I do not treat what Dominicans explicitly say about Haitians but, rather, try to tease out meanings embedded in metaphors, images, and forms of contact. After the 1937 Haitian massacre, the state embarked on a heavy propaganda campaign to demonize Haiti, constructing the slaughter as the result of popular tensions between Haitians and Dominicans in the border. After fifty years of anti-Haitian socialization through schools and the press, virtually all border residents today echo at least the metaphors of official anti-Haitianism, even if their actions belied their belief by marrying Haitians and, in many cases, actively resisting the state's slaughter. Even though the state was able to enforce a language of racial hatred, the implicit rhetoric of practice told another story.

The word, *frontière*, originally derived from the French *front*, an architectural term denoting the facade of a building.⁵ Indeed, the two capitals of both

countries have often defined the Haitian–Dominican border as a national shield, a privileged site reflecting the collective honor of the nation as a whole. The official rendering of the border as the locus of collective national dignity can be seen in the import of tiny border skirmishes to the capitals, the inability of the two countries to ratify myriad border demarcations, and the 1937 Haitian massacre itself. The Dominican Republic has a history of defining its national identity in relation to Haiti, and the border has a privileged role therein, as the site where power relations on the island have been measured throughout the centuries.⁶ A relationship of national rivalry has existed ever since Haiti occupied the Dominican Republic (1822–44), although the country was later annexed to Spain, finally achieving independence in 1865. Official anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic, the reigning national dogma ever since the massacre, sharpened the meaning of the border, seeking to render what was previously a porous frontier into an immutable scar.⁷

However, the border has concurrently been seen by *capitaleño* elites as the primordial sign and site of barbarism, of a hybrid space of racial and international admixture, and of the dangers of caudillo, or strongman, rule. Inherited from colonial Spain, this imaginary spatial map delimits those included and excluded from the nation and has justified conquest by the Creole elite from the cosmopolitan capital, in which civilization resides, of the savage and uncontrolled backlands, which represent barbarism. This gloss provided a neat justification for the Haitian massacre: The border or skin of the body politic was perceived to be transgressive because it mixed social taxonomies, was a threat to the nation in its very liminality, and was an area as yet undomesticated by the state.⁸ Nonetheless, the practice of everyday life belied the international boundary in the period preceding the slaughter. The mapping of difference in the borderlands was only partially one of international distinction, since markets, schools, and even landholdings crosscut the natural Haitian–Dominican divisory line. Popular Dominican attitudes towards

⁶ See Jorge Mañach, *Frontiers in the Americas: A Global Perspective*, Philip H. Phenix, trans. (New York: Teacher's College Press, Columbia University, 1975), 16, 26. Peter Sahlin, in *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), explores the process by which national identities became articulated along the border of France and Spain. Although his concern is primarily with the development of popular notions of identity on the border, the historical process of the development of official French and Spanish borders was exported to their colonies and can be seen as a kind of colonial mimesis in the history of the Haitian–Dominican border.

⁷ Lauren Derby and Richard Turits, "Historias de terror."

⁸ For more on civilization and barbarism in the Latin American imagination and its utility for justifying state violence in borders, see Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski, "Dismembering and Remembering the Nation: The Semantics of Political Violence in Venezuela," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 33:2 (April 1991), 288–337; Silvio R. Duncan Baretta and John Markoff, "Civilization and Barbarism: Cattle Frontiers in Latin America," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 20:4 (October 1978), 587–620; Ana Maria Alonso, "Gender, Ethnicity, and the Constitution of Subjects: Accommodation, Resistance and Revolution on the Chihuahuan Frontier" (Ph.D. Diss., Anthropology Department, University of Chicago, 1988, vol. 1, 24–25); and Lauren Derby, "Histories of Power and the Powers of History in the Dominican

⁴ Evidence of this taxonomy may be seen in the Dominican passport application in use in 1932. It listed the following as identifying features: name, age, race, color, eye color, civil status, birth marks (Consulado General de la República, Puerto Príncipe, Haiti, exp. asuntos varios, leg. 10, 27 Sep. 1932, Archivo General de la Nación, Santo Domingo, hereinafter AGN). In this usage, *raza* is synonymous with *nación*, which in the 1920s meant "the collectivity of persons who have the same ethnic origin and, in general, speak the same language and possess a common tradition" (*The Dictionary of the Spanish Academy* [1925 edition], cited in E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 15). "Color" is the internal taxonomy (not synonymous with *raza*) used to differentiate between Dominicans of different shades, i.e., Dominicans are all one *raza*, but of different *colores* and hair textures (i.e., "pelo malo," etc.). A few Dominican elites, however, did use *raza* as synonymous with color. Since the popular Dominican notion of race hovers somewhere between the United States notion of race and ethnicity, I have chosen here to use the term, race, when discussing ideology and the term ethnicity when discussing labor regimes and kinship structures.

⁵ Lucien Febvre, "Frontière: the Word and the Concept," *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Lucien Febvre*, D. Parry, ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1973), 209.




FIGURE 1. The Borderlands between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, based on the boundary established by treaty in 1936. Credit: Emily Vogt, Committee on Geographical Studies, University of Chicago.

Haitians concerned the boundaries separating self from other; these attitudes were not territorial or racialized but, rather, cultural, as we shall see below.

Since the founding of the French and Spanish colonies which gave rise to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the relative isolation of the border has endowed it with a socio-cultural logic distinct from either of the two dominant societies, partly due to the peculiarities of the local economy. From the late nineteenth century through the 1920s,⁹ the economies of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic turned toward large-scale sugar production. Yet the Dominican frontier, based predominantly on either cattle (in the northern provinces) or coffee (in the central-southern regions) and supplemental agricultural production for domestic use and exchange, remained distinct. But the uniqueness of the frontier was more than merely economic. Because they were not integrated with major Dominican towns, due to the lack of sufficient roads, the Dominican border provinces maintained networks of commerce with Haitian urban centers inherited from the colonial period. An international economy developed as a result of the affluence, proximity, and convenience of major Haitian markets. Furthermore, while various efforts were made over the centuries to demarcate the borderline, the first mutually accepted border

agreement was ratified as late as 1936. Even then, border policies radiating from Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo (the Haitian and Dominican capitals) were difficult, if not impossible, to implement in the borderlands because the terrain was so rough. The northern and southern border provinces are separated by the Cordillera Central, a series of rocky mountains that prevented the construction of even the most rudimentary roads linking the north and south axes of the island until the 1940s. Even today, inter-border provincial transit is close to impossible, save by Jeep or mule; and the myriad well-worn footpaths winding through Haitian and Dominican hamlets are used far more frequently than the Transnational Highway built by the Trujillo regime. These walkways silently attest to the popular denial of the official border, marking in space the arteries of a common Haitian-Dominican culture that transgresses the national divide imagined by elites in the respective capitals.¹⁰

RAZA: RHETORIC AND PRACTICE

While a common border culture developed in the frontier provinces of the Dominican Republic, there has also always existed a clear notion of difference between Haitians and Dominicans.¹¹ The various discourses of anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic run along a continuum from a politicized nationalist demonology to that of merely cataloguing the lexicon of ethnic distinction. In the Dominican capital, Santo Domingo, notions of Haitian alterity have always been more extreme, categorical, and radical than in the borderlands, due to the lack of contact between groups. For example, the sign of ethnicity has become so unhinged from its referent in Santo Domingo that the term, Haitian, is now a floating label of misconduct, improper behavior, or lack of civility that one hears, for example, shouted by a motorist at a stray cyclist when he cuts abruptly in front of his path. The use of this label is perhaps the equivalent to "fool" or "crazy person" in English. In dominant Dominican ideology, anti-Haitianism is essentially a class-based prejudice, a rejection of the sub-stratum of Haitian cane cutters who are seen as patently subhuman.¹²

In the Dominican border of the 1920s, the meaning of difference was more grounded in everyday practice because Haitians and Dominicans interacted along a variety of axes due to extensive intermarriage and mutual ties of

¹⁰ For more on this, see Richard Turits, "Perils of History."

¹¹ For another discussion of Haitian-Dominican border culture, see Richard Turits, "Perils of History." For more on borderland cultures, see Renato Rosaldo, "Border Crossings" in his *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 196-217.

¹² This prejudice is why anti-Haitianism as found in the capital, Santo Domingo, and in most parts of the country is often treated as mere racism, an explanation which neglects the nationalist valence of anti-Haitianism and fails to distinguish between attitudes towards Haitian cane cutters and those of other occupational groups, as well as between perceptions of Haitians and black Dominicans. For more on the shocking treatment of Haitian cane cutters in the Dominican Republic, see Maurice Lemoine, *Bitter Sugar: Slaves Today in the Caribbean* [Sucre amer: Esclaves aujourd'hui dans les Caraïbes] (Paris: Nouvelle 1981; Chicago: Banner Press, 1985). For an example of the literature which treats anti-Haitianism as racism, see Meindert Fennema and Troetje Loewenthal, *Construcción de raza y nación en República Dominicana* (Santo Domini-

⁹ The United States Marines occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924.

interdependence in an area of extreme poverty and because many Dominican border residents regularly visited Haiti to buy merchandise or sell cattle. In comparison to the images of Haitians portrayed in Dominican nationalist discourse, border stereotypes of the Haitian Other and markers of racial boundaries are complex and multivalent. Part of this stems from the fact that, as Dominguez has said, the objectification of collective identities by insiders and outsiders is both semiotic and political¹³; and the political geography of Dominican border society on a quotidian level was contradictory. Haitians and Dominicans were both drawn together and pulled apart through ties of kinship and affinity in the marketplace and in relation to larger figures of power and authority. A relative equality of poverty both drew people together in times of scarcity, for example, in the communal *konbit* (*junta*, in Spanish) or work brigades, yet created jealousy and friction over scarce resources. Dominican border culture must be understood both as furnishing a common Haitian-Dominican identity in relation to centers of power and outsiders, and as containing fissures of separation, invisible internal indices of difference and differentiation that could become divisive when conflict arose.¹⁴

The notion of community implies a self-referentiality and stability inappropriate to the Haitian-Dominican border culture, which existed in a region that was inherently hybrid and pluralistic between nations and cultural loci. This culture presents a challenge to models that presuppose a stable, univocal order.¹⁵ Moreover, as Sabean has argued for early modern Germany (drawing upon Leach), types of social dangers can be mapped onto the kinship structure within tightly-knit village communities. In his case the division between affines and blood kin (here, Haitians and Dominicans) became the key symbolic matrix for articulating notions of intended and unintended danger, pollution, and aggression.¹⁶ He demonstrates that witchcraft can become a language for expressing envy or the dangers emanating from potentially competitive social equals. In the case of the Dominican border, a perceived basic social division between Haitian affines and Dominican blood kin provided a similar axis upon which power discrepancies were metaphorically mapped. As explained below, Haitians could be seen as the repository of potential symbolic violence, particularly in times of scarcity and resource competition.

Making sense of the complex mapping of collective identities in this liminal

area entails examining the historical formation of images of the Other as they were shaped through Haitian-Dominican contact and the practice of everyday life. Clearly there were both structures of being together, of sociality, and of segregation and difference which can also be seen as particular forms of "copresence."¹⁷ Local constructions of identity are not merely imparted linguistically but are also embodied and thus made known only through the enactment of systems of social classification. Conventions of social interaction, of habitual patterns governing the use of space and the body, and of the orchestration of practical activities can reveal domains of identity and difference that may remain invisible in an analysis that focuses merely on the rhetoric of difference.¹⁸

Anti-Haitianism must be understood as more than racism as such. It arose initially as consciousness of colonial difference, an identity marked first by language (French versus Spanish; the import of the linguistic ascription of alterity still lingers today), then by a series of derivative collective assertions of differences originating in colonial rivalries between the French and Spanish. Anti-Haitianism's second layer of meaning stemmed from Saint Domingue's (which later became Haiti) former economic supremacy and colonial grandeur, in stark contrast to the poverty of the Spanish colony. The highly stratified hierarchy of class and color that developed in Haiti as a result of the sugar-plantation complex was very different from the social fluidity, minimal class differentiation, and maximal racial mixture of the open-range livestock economy of Santo Domingo.¹⁹ Finally, during the nineteenth century, the idea of Haiti derived from its status as an occupying force (1822-44) and thus as the traditional enemy of the Dominican Republic. As a form of social classification this meaning coincided with an emergent consciousness of national difference. Attitudes toward Haiti today retain traces of fear and mistrust characteristic of

¹⁷ Mary Louise Pratt, "Bordertalk" (Presentation at conference on Narrative Strategies and Cultural Practices, University of Notre Dame, April 1990). See also her "Linguistic Utopias" in *The Linguistics of Writing: Arguments between Language and Literature*, Nigel Fabb et al., eds. (New York: Methuen, 1987), 56-60.

¹⁸ Michael Jackson, *Paths Towards a Clearing: Radical Empiricism and Ethnographic Inquiry* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 122-28. Jackson develops Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus, elaborated in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Richard Nice, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). For perspectives that assign a central role to language in the construction of racial-cum-ethnic boundaries, see Henry Louis Gates, "Introduction: Writing 'Race' and the Difference It Makes," in *Race, Writing and Difference*, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 6. In this view, language is the primary sign of race. To a lesser extent, this perspective is shared by Werner Sollers. See his "Introduction: The Invention of Ethnicity," in *The Invention of Ethnicity*, Werner Sollers, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), xx. On the links between language, racism and nationalism, see Etienne Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* [Race, nation, classe; les identités ambiguës] (Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 3d ed. 1988; New York: Verso, 1991), 86-106.

¹⁹ For one contemporary observer's view, see M.L.E. Moreau de St. Mery, *Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie Française de l'île de Saint Domingue*, vols. I and II (Philadelphia: np., 1797); and his *Topographical and Political Descrip-*

¹³ Virginia Dominguez, *People as Subject, People as Object: Selfhood and Peoplehood in Contemporary Israel* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 12.

¹⁴ I want to stress, however, that even given these tensions there was a tightly knit Haitian-Dominican border community. Thus, I disagree with Box and de la Rive's assumption that a "racial frontier" divided the two nations and peoples before the massacre, particularly at the local level of the border communities. For their argument, see Louk Box and Barbara de la Rive Box-Lasocki, "Sociedad fronteriza o frontera social? Transformaciones sociales en la zona fronteriza de la República Dominicana (1907-1984)," *Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, 46 (June 1989), 49-69, especially 52.

¹⁵ Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis*, 216.

¹⁶ David Warren Sabean, *Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 100.

national rivalry, albeit resulting from the memory of Haitian nineteenth-century domination that the Trujillo regime resurrected and reinscribed.²⁰

Anti-Haitianism does not fit most models of race or ethnicity, as it retains traces of its meaning as a species of racialized nationalism. Much of the literature on ethnicity presumes that ethnic consciousness arises from the asymmetrical incorporation of ethnic groups into the labor force, even when such ethnicities are later politicized by the state.²¹ Although consciousness of difference in the Haitian-Dominican borderlands was in part the product of an ethnic division of labor, this was not uniformly the case. In some regions, Haitians and Dominicans formed a common underclass of sharecroppers and field hands and thus were united in class terms. Moreover, extensive kinship links between the two groups made it nearly impossible to discern clear fissures between Haitians and Dominicans in economic terms. The complexity and multivalence of Haitian-Dominican difference requires an examination of group interactions at the level of all forms of practice—political, religious, economic and social—because ethnic identity was not derived solely from articulation with productive relations.²² However, Haitians were identified with popular religious idioms and with money; and from these associations arose a host of notions of ethnic distinction, a point elaborated in the final section of this essay.

THE FRONTIER: HISTORY, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

The origins of Dominican cattle culture lay in the poverty and low person-to-land ratio of colonial Santo Domingo, once Spanish colonial attention had shifted to the rich silver mines of Mexico and Peru. Ranching became the primary national industry and flourished in the seventeenth century, albeit illegally, as skins were sold as contraband to pirates, filibusterers, and buccaneers. By the mid-eighteenth century, the spectacular growth of sugar produc-

²⁰ See Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Guerra Dominico-haitiana: Documentos para su estudio*, vol. II (1944; Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1957); Joaquín Balaguer [the current president of the country and a close ally of Trujillo's], *La realidad dominicana: semblanza de un país y de un régimen* (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Ferrari Hermanos, 1947); and especially Angel S. del Rosario Pérez, *La exterminación añorada* (Ciudad Trujillo: np., 1957). This latter text is rumored to actually have been written by Balaguer. One of the most important anti-Haitian ideologues of the regime was Manuel Arturo Peña Batlle (see Raymundo González, "Peña Batlle y su concepto histórico de la nación dominicana," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* [Madrid], vol. XLVIII [1992], 585–630).

²¹ Stanley J. Tambiah, "Ethnic Conflict in the World Today," *American Ethnologist*, 16:2 (May 1989), 335–49; Edwin N. Wilmsen, *Land Filled with Flies: A Political Economy of the Kalahari* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); John L. Comaroff, "Of Totemism and Ethnicity: Consciousness, Practice and the Signs of Inequality," *Ethnos*, 52: 3–4 (1987), 307–8, 311–2.

²² See G. Carter Bentley, "Ethnicity and Practice," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 29:1 (January 1987), 24–55 for a different application of Bourdieu's notion of practice in a discussion of ethnic identity. Kevin A. Yelvington's critique of this model argues that "the activity of 'ethnic others'" is a crucial factor in the social construction of ethnicity. See his "Ethnicity as Practice? A Comment on Bentley," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 33:1 (January 1991), 158–68. Clearly, in the Haitian-Dominican case, national, ethnic, or racial identities arose dialectically, particularly in the borderlands.

tion in neighboring French colonial Haiti had created a thriving market for skins and smoked-meat products. During this period, frontier cattle culture expanded and central-southern frontier towns, such as Hinche (Haiti) and Bánica (the Dominican Republic), thrived due to their strategic location en route to Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital. Dominican authors have labeled the Dominican Republic in this period "doubly dependent," referring to the political and military domination of Spain, as well as the reliance upon the Haitian economy, the primary market for Dominican products.²³

If, for the Dominican Republic, the border during the eighteenth century became the locus of a struggle to reap the benefits of a brisk, largely illegal cattle trade; for Haiti the loosely controlled border was a siphon for escaped slaves, a continual thorn in the side of the French colonial planter class that mourned the constant drain of capital in labor. The Spanish side of the border was a desirable refuge for runaway slaves, as they were rarely repatriated, manumission was more liberally practiced under Spanish colonial policy, and a life of semi-autonomous cattle herding was far less arduous than the backbreaking travail of cutting cane. By the mid-1700s, Lundahl reports, 3,000 slaves from the French colony were resident in the Spanish border areas; by the 1770s, Haitian maroons constituted the majority in the Dominican border towns.²⁴

As cattle ranching became the principal economic activity in the Dominican Republic, slavery had an altogether distinct character than in other regions of the West Indies, where slavery was almost universally coupled with intensive sugar production and a rigid plantation hierarchy.²⁵ The majority of the Dominican open grazing ranches, or *hatos*, were relatively small; only the largest *hatos* concentrated around the capital, employing non-kin labor. The cattle were allowed to range freely and were not corralled; indeed, some families lived solely by hunting wild cattle. In this highly fluid social system, many escaped slaves established their own *hatos*. The end result of the extensive ranching economy, of the relative poverty of the colonists, and of the low

²³ Ruben Silié, *Economía, esclavitud y población: ensayos de interpretación histórica del Santo Domingo Español en el siglo XVIII* (Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo, 1976), 35, 24. For more on the cattle economy, slavery, and land tenure, see José M. Ots Capdequí, *El régimen de la tierra en la América Española durante el período colonial* (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1946); and Carlos Esteban Deive, *La esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo (1492–1844)*, vols. I and II (Santo Domingo: Museo del Hombre Dominicano, 1980).

²⁴ Mats Lundahl, "Haitian Migration to the Dominican Republic," in his *The Haitian Economy: Man, Land and Markets* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 112–3.

²⁵ The only case parallel to the Dominican Republic may be parts of Brazil, particularly along the southern frontier with Uruguay, where cattle ranchers did employ slaves. Bahia also had a cycle of cattle ranching combined with the use of slave labor, but several factors rendered this experience distinct from the Dominican case: Cattle ranching was practiced only at the margins of the dominant sugar economy (while in Santo Domingo, it was the central activity); it occurred in an area of high population density; and ranching was never highly capitalized because it was for the domestic market. See Manuel Correia de Andrade, *A terra e o homem no nordeste* (Sao Paulo, 1963), 135–45.

demographic density was a high degree of manumission and resultant miscegenation which is particularly striking when compared to the highly polarized social structure that developed within the plantation hierarchy of neighboring Haiti.²⁶

A period of political chaos on the island in the first part of the nineteenth century brought the frontier regional economy virtually to a halt and caused extensive emigration from these zones. First, the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) drew the eastern side of the island into the widening civil war; later, several Haitian military incursions culminated in a twenty-two-year occupation of the Spanish colony (1822–44) and, finally, in war against the Spanish, which ended in 1865 when the Dominican Republic became independent. Lundahl believes that the territory freed by emigration from the frontier was quickly taken over by Haitian immigrants, particularly in the central region of the frontier.²⁷ Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the depression in the Dominican frontier was compounded when U.S.-owned sugar plantations developed in the southeast, causing yet another wave of emigration from the border. In response, the frontier economy once again turned towards Haiti.²⁸ Cattle production again became the basis of the border provincial economies, in part as a result of the new availability of land and the necessity of returning to more extensive methods of production due to labor shortages. Furthermore, the national economic shift towards the eastern regions encouraged the deepening of border trade networks with Haiti, a logical shift due to the region's proximity to the major Haitian cities of Cap-Haïtien in the north and Port-au-Prince in the south.²⁹ Because much of this new commercial activity was in contraband, municipal authorities complained about the extent of trade with Haiti, couching their statements in nationalist terms (although free commerce with Haiti had been established in 1874). Probably these authorities were alarmed by the provincial governments' inability to capture the profits of the new bustling commerce.

²⁶ Ruben Silié, *Economía*, 26–29. See also Esteban Deive, *Esclavitud*, vol. I: 103–54, 341–67 and vol. II: 545–98. For information on border *hato* production, see Palmer, "Land Use." On Haitian social structure, see David Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

²⁷ Lundahl states that the Dominican population was reduced by nearly 50 percent in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, then nearly doubled by mid-century, largely through Haitian immigration. See Lundahl, "Haitian Migration," 116.

²⁸ See Michiel Baud, "The Origins of Capitalist Agriculture in the Dominican Republic," *Latin American Research Review*, 12:2 (1987), 135–54, especially 143.

²⁹ For more on turn-of-the-century economic changes and their impact on regional economies, including the border, see Michiel Baud, "Transformación capitalista y regionalización en la República Dominicana, 1875–1920," *Investigación y Ciencia*, 1:1 (January–August 1986), 18–34; Samuel Hazard, *Santo Domingo Past and Present; with a Glance at Haiti* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1873; reprint Santo Domingo: Sociedad de Bibliófilos, 1974), 246. For more on the development of sugar plantations, see Bruce Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); and José del Castillo, "La inmigración de braceros azucareros en la República Dominicana, 1900–1930," in *Cuadernos de CENDIA* (Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma, No. 7, nd.).

With the onset of liberal rule in the Dominican Republic in 1879, such leaders as Ulises Heureaux (1882–84; 1887–99) and Ramón Cáceres (1906–11) gave top priority to state-led economic development, financing it largely through foreign investment and loans. Liberal reformers saw agricultural development and smallholding cultivation as a cure for the national vices associated with cattle culture on public lands. Unfenced animals, like stateless caudillos, were seen as social parasites preying on the private property and hard work of others. Liberal reformers virulently focused their attack on fencing laws privileging ranchers (since fencing was effectively the onus of cultivators in many regions until the 1930s). The reformers' civilizing mission, however, was broader. It involved the vilification of an entire backlands way of life, an "original affluent society"³⁰ of wild-meat hunting and subsistence slash-and-burn agriculture in the hills. In the words of Emiliano Tejera,

The revolutionary and the pig are the two principal enemies of the country. . . . The burdened property is that of the individual dedicated to agriculture . . . and the one privileged by law is the rancher, who spends most of his time in his hamac, playing guitar, or visiting his neighbor, and the prejudiced is the agriculturalist who fertilizes the countryside with the sweat of his brow, feeding the populations and carrying a huge burden with the product of his industriousness.³¹

José Ramón Abad suggested establishing practical schools for agricultural training, for model farms, and for farm asylums to teach the virtues of private property and eliminate the twin evils of the nefarious *mesta* tradition (free ranching) brought by colonial Spain and the *terrenos comuneros*, or communal lands. Abad saw rural smallholding as an "ennobling" and civilizing force. As he states,

the land should be the well-guaranteed property of the cultured man, the always fertile workshop of regular and orderly work, not the wrong-headed, unproductive and anonymous pastures of ranching, nor the silent theatre of a vagabond life.³²

More important than these liberal tirades in changing the nature of borderland society, however, was the installment of customs houses staffed by the United States along the border in 1907 in an effort to reclaim proceeds for delinquent repayment of loans to European and U.S. creditors. The creation of a U.S. customs receivership in the border imposed for the first time effective accounting on Haitian–Dominican trade, with high fines exacted for contraband violations. This assault on local commerce was met with fierce resistance; in one frontier depot, a customs house was destroyed, and eighteen

³⁰ Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1972).

³¹ "Párrafos de las memorias presentadas por D. Emiliano Tejera en su calidad de Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República en los años 1906–1907 i 1908" (Reprinted in *Clio*, LI (1942), 13). I would like to thank Raymundo González for bringing this text to my attention. (All translations are my own.)

³² José Ramón Abad, *La República Dominicana: reseña general geográfico-estadística* (Santo Domingo: Imprenta de García Hermanos, 1888), 288. See also 260, 77, 286, etc.

U.S. customs officials were injured or killed in skirmishes with contrabandists within the first twenty-eight months of the accord.³³

Ironically, however, during the Americanization of the border, Haitianization became a common complaint, as well as a floating trope, under which many groups could cloak their own particular interests.³⁴ Cattle ranchers, for example, used allegations of Haitian cattle thefts across the border to conceal their own illegal livestock commerce. Dominican journals of the first decades of the twentieth century record numerous harangues against the Haitianization of the border. This implies that a newly heightened concept of national identity resulting from the gradual surrender of national sovereignty to the United States, which Dominicans could not control, was displaced and redirected towards Haiti, a problem over which they had some control.

As the frontier was brought into the gaze of the state, the border began to be seen as the skin of the body politic but one all too frequently seen by capital elites as bleeding into Haiti. For example, some municipal border authorities charged that Haitian Kreol had become the lingua franca in many Dominican border provinces; others lamented that when border Dominicans referred to "the capital," they meant Port-au-Prince, rather than Santo Domingo.³⁵ Some deplored the fact that Haitian money circulated as far inland as Santiago, the second largest city of the Dominican Republic (although, since the Dominican Republic did not establish a national currency until the Trujillo administration, one must ask why this was considered a problem of national concern). This association of Haitians with the production and circulation of value (and, as we shall see, with fertility) is a recurring metaphor explored in greater detail below.

Nationalist rhetoric aside, however, national and municipal authorities did not necessarily agree on what was regarded as the problem of Haitian-Dominican contraband. This was understandable because the same customs inspectors who struggled to control this prosperous trade in public also benefitted tremendously from it in private. The problem for northern Dominican border officials was not the existence of contraband per se, but the higher tariff rates of the Haitian border custom houses which, they argued, prohibited Dominicans from crossing the border to sell their cattle, produce, tobacco, sugar, and rice in Ouanaminthe, the neighboring Haitian town. There was a variety of opinion over how to cope with the problem of contraband: Not all 9municipal authorities thought that strict control of border transit was the

optimal policy option. In 1920 the municipal government of Monte Cristi, a northern Dominican coastal town, petitioned for "the free passage of Haitians through this part of the border" on the grounds that this was absolutely "indispensable for commerce."³⁶ For the most part, local officials saw their interests in league with, not opposed to, Haiti. But the new border control was aimed at more than merely raising tariff income: It was equally aimed at controlling a population previously uncaptured by the state.

STATE FORMATION, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND THE REDEFINITION OF DEVIANCE

From the late-nineteenth century into the early 1930s, a newly expanded state apparatus began to penetrate daily life in the frontier. State growth was a result of increased governmental revenues and a new liberal vision of the state exemplified in the work of such thinkers as Américo Lugo (1870–1938). Heavily influenced by European positivism, such Dominican liberals as Lugo argued that due to the "deficiency" of the Dominican racial mixture and low level of mass literacy, the "people" were not prepared for self-governing democracy as in the United States. In this view, the state must be accorded the role both of educator of civic values and of agent of nationhood. The state, lead by the "cultured" aristocracy, must be a civilizing force exercised through "tutelary law," a force that both collectivized the nation as it separated individuals.³⁷ While in most provinces greater state influence during this period was felt through the expanded powers of regional governors, the fact that border provincial capitals were far from the frontier meant that the agents of expanded state control in the border were most often the urban middle classes of the new public sector, such as school teachers, and in the 1920s, sanitation officials.

Although much of the new legislation accompanying state building appears minute and inconsequential, that legislation entailed new modes of social discipline and control and a novel penetration of the state in arenas previously defined as private and thus not formerly subject to national authority. These laws served both to collectivize the nation through tightening border controls and create new social identities through forming a range of new social taxonomies which forged metaphoric links associating certain groups and divid-

³³ Marlin D. Clausner, *Rural Santo Domingo* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), 142, quoted in Mats Lundahl and Jan Lundius, "Socioeconomic Foundations of a Messianic Cult: Olivorismo in the Dominican Republic," in *Agrarian Society and History: Essays in Honor of Magnus Mörner*, Mats Lundahl and Thommy Svensson, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1990), 201–38.

³⁴ I am grateful to Richard Turits for this idea. The argument that border residents used national identity for instrumental purposes is also a central argument in Sahlins, *Boundaries*.

³⁵ Baud, "Transición capitalista," 34.

³⁶ Gobernación de Monte Cristi 21 (1919–1921), 10 Jan 1920, AGN. I have used the now-standardized spellings for Haitian and Dominican place names in my own text (and in the map), although I have left the archival versions as I found them. For more on border contraband and frontier resistance to state penetration, see Michiel Baud, "Una frontera-refugio: Dominicanos y Haitianos contra el estado (1870–1930)," *Estudios Sociales*, 26:92 (April–June) 1993, 39–64.

³⁷ See Américo Lugo, "El estado dominicano ante el derecho público" and "Sobre política," in *Américo Lugo: Antología*, Vetilio Alfau Duran, ed. (Ciudad Trujillo: Librería Dominicana, 1949); see also Roberto Cassá, "Teoría de la Nación y Proyecto Político en Américo Lugo" (Unpublished manuscript, 1993). Although liberalism as dominant ideology clearly met its demise with the Trujillo regime, many of its assumptions continued to shape *trujillismo*, including the "civilizing" role of the state.

ing others. For example, laws were introduced to redefine the value and significance of land because the majority of Dominican land until the 1920s was held in common. Legal instruments created to facilitate development by sanctifying private landholding, however, also provided a basis for conflict between individuals and social groups and for abuse by local authorities. The state began to craft a new national identity by partitioning space, sharpening boundaries, and expanding the public sphere, as enclosure and rank were introduced, codified, legally inscribed, and ritually protected.³⁸

Although many analysts of the Haitian massacre have focused on the appearance of legislation related to the Haitian population during this period,³⁹ the new immigration laws should be seen as part of a larger body of novel laws and routines of rule aimed at differentiating groups and mapping new vertical and horizontal domains. Some of these, such as the 1912 law proclaiming Spanish as the official language, were primarily symbolic. But this, combined with a gradually increasing stringency towards border crossing—as an identification card was required to pass the customs depot in the late 1920s and a passport, visa or certificate of good conduct was required in 1930—reinscribed the border as a national marker and separated Dominican insiders from Haitian outsiders in a new way. Reinforcing this trend, the 1907 convention militarized the border by inaugurating a “Guardia de Frontera” to police the frontier.⁴⁰ Despite the ample evidence that the border remained relatively porous, such legislation did serve to stratify border crossing, creating a new social division between the privileged stratum of individuals who crossed legally and those who simply avoided the military checkpoints or paid off the guardia who staffed them, such as the Haitian traders who were too poor to pay the new heavy tariffs and the large cattle ranchers who invoked the “moral economy” of the old system.⁴¹ Although such legal hindrances most probably did not alter the popular frontier circuit, they placed people in a more direct relationship to official definitions of nationhood and provided not only a new prism through which Haitian–Dominican contact was understood but also invisible codes of difference which could be invoked from time to time by certain groups.

A desire on the part of the Dominican state to more effectively *vigilar* (guard or watch) the border dates from the late-nineteenth-century Heureaux administration. A period of political instability in Haiti first spurred efforts to police the frontier. Municipal authorities began to install *guardias rurales*

(rural police) along the border and reported on the activities of both Haitian and Dominican “subversives” and “enemies,” their “insidious propaganda,” and their movements.⁴² Here the desire on the part of Dominican authorities to watch and control frontier movements manifested a concern with national security, an extension of the nineteenth-century vision in which local government saw both Haitians and Dominican border residents as outsiders and constantly feared their possible collusion. The nation was seen as a bounded territory defined by the borderline, a spatial marker to be visibly displayed. Indeed, a new offense in the 1890s is that of abusing or tampering with the Dominican flag.⁴³

The overwhelming concern of the Heureaux administration was with both Haitian and Dominican “revolutionaries,” regarded as anyone who was an “enemy of the Government” crossing the border and having access to firearms. Border and municipal authorities struggled to maintain a monopoly of force, largely to no avail. Indeed, the state’s great difficulty in establishing its authority can be seen in the numerous complaints by local authorities that local “subversives” were mocking (*burlando*) state representatives.⁴⁴

Although the problem of safeguarding the frontier remained a preoccupation of the state from the Heureaux administration to the U.S. occupation, its meaning changed. During the earlier period, the concern is military and territorial; and the Others are the dangerous frontier residents, both Haitian and Dominican, who are constantly seen to be colluding against state power. The primary axis of difference is official versus popular. Indeed, many of the early-twentieth-century frontier Dominican caudillos did have followers of Haitian nationality, such as Desiderio Arias, whose sidekick, Rosilien, an infamous Haitian bandit, is still an important icon in the collective memory of northern border residents.⁴⁵ The idea of the frontier as a dangerous space continued under the U.S. military government but with a new meaning.

Gradually, the insider versus outsider system of classification was elaborated from an encompassing notion of nationhood to one based upon an intricate series of differentiations. National Otherness was expanded and further refined to exclude all those with “repugnant” or contagious diseases, physical defects, and indigents, as well as women travelling alone.⁴⁶ A new

³⁸ Ministerio de lo Interior y Policía, 18 Jul 1903, No. 154, Gobernador de Azua, AGN.

³⁹ Gobernación de Barahona 6 (1896–1903), 24 Mar 1896, No. 1117.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 20 Oct 1902 and 28 Oct 1902, AGN.

⁴¹ See Nancie L. González, “Desiderio Arias: Caudillo, Bandit and Culture Hero,” *Journal of American Folklore*, 85:335 (January–March 1972), 42–50.

⁴² The full text of Article 10 of Immigration Law No. 95 excluded the following: “a) Persons with repulsive, dangerous or contagious diseases, or epileptics; b) Persons with physical or mental defects or with diseases that seriously affect their ability to make a living; c) Persons predisposed to become dependent upon public welfare, indigents, beggars, peddlers, or those with other detriments; d) women who travel alone and who cannot prove to the satisfaction of the civil servant in charge that they can comply with this law, that have a good reputation [que gozan de buena reputación]” (Inspección de Inmigración de Monte Cristy, Paq. 1, Leg. 5–8, 22 Feb.

³⁸ I am drawing here upon Bernard Cohn and Nicolas Dirks, “Beyond the Fringe: The Nation State, Colonialism, and the Technologies of Power,” *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 1:2 (June 1988), 224–29; and Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayre, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

³⁹ See Fennema and Loewenthal, *Raza y nación*; and Bernardo Vega, *Trujillo y Haiti*.

⁴⁰ Ministerio de lo Interior y Policía, 216–217, March 1906, AGN.

⁴¹ The passport requirement was introduced August 8, 1930 in the Dominican Republic, although Haiti only required a visa for certain categories of travellers.

symbolic equation linked the mentally ill, the diseased, and single women, uniting them as socially marginal and therefore a danger to public order and morality. This new formulation of social lowness implicitly included Haitians, a link elaborated under Trujillo, as the anti-Haitian discourse which became official in the 1940s associated Haitians with all forms of bodily pollution, especially disease and contagion.⁴⁷ This legislation especially affected two of the most active and well-financed groups: Dominican women who worked as prostitutes in Haiti, who were defined as illicit unless they could prove they had an "honest reputation," and Haitian market women, who furnished the majority of all produce and imported manufactured goods to Dominican provincial markets. At times these connections were rendered explicit, when the Sanitation Official of Monte Cristi registered complaints about the high incidence of beggars in the northern Dominican border towns and the presence of "illegal" Haitian immigrants walking the streets and endangering public health and welfare through their contamination with "contagious diseases." These immigrants were seen as making a "sad spectacle" which "prejudice[d] the good customs and concept of culture of our society."⁴⁸ The nation is transformed here in meaning through the redefinition of its boundaries, as the civilized center narrows to include, apparently, little more than healthy, employed Dominican men.

The first years of U.S. military rule saw considerable conflict between local social and racial taxonomies and those the state sought to impose. This tension is apparent in efforts to collect more efficiently a series of new taxes imposed on local residents. One inspector reported in 1920 that he had explained the "morality" of paying taxes, that this was a feature of all the "organized" peoples of the world, and that the new laws prohibiting gambling and vagrancy must be followed.⁴⁹ This comment, however, also reveals the prestige local elites now attributed to the trappings of modernity, as state allegiance became synonymous with high culture and spontaneous forms of popular recreation came to be seen as illicit.

The bulk of this report, however, is concerned with how to define the population of the central border province of Restauración, as the majority of the population there was composed of people of Haitian origin. The official

1941, Correspondencias Recibidas, AGN). This law was based on an earlier, similar version which also excluded "anarchists and those who profess doctrines that could be considered dangerous," "idiots and crazy people," and minors unaccompanied by their parents (Ley #739, Interior y Policía, 14 June 1937, "Cronológico," AGN).

⁴⁷ I analyze official anti-Haitianism in detail in my essay, "Histories of Power." My analysis of the cultural categories of "lowness" and pollution metaphors draws heavily upon Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (1966; London: ARC Paperbacks, 1988); Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his World*, Hélène Iswolsky, trans. (1965; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).

⁴⁸ Gobernación de Monte Cristi 21 (1919–1921), 8 Oct. 1920, No. 1313, AGN.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 21 Aug 1920, No. 1281, AGN.

states that while they were considered Dominican citizens under the constitution because they had been born on Dominican soil, Dominicans in the area considered the residents of Restauración Haitians, as did they themselves.⁵⁰ This issue is left unresolved in the report but indicates a collision between the sharply delimited national–territorial system of social classification of the Americans on the one hand and the cultural notion of race employed by area residents on the other. This may also indicate that the consciousness of a population of outsiders in the border population began as a result of American efforts to classify that population.

During the years of the U.S. occupation, a barrage of new legislation seeking to regulate daily life apparently took a heavy toll on a population traditionally accustomed to a maximum degree of independence. These laws also redefined the public and private spheres and established new concepts of time and space. During the U.S. occupation, cockfights were confined to Sundays and holidays, the use of "witchcraft . . . hoodooism, or other superstitious or deceitful methods" in popular medicine were banned,⁵¹ and forced labor on public works was instituted. Most of this legislation was passed within Trujillo's first few years in office. In the 1930s mandatory primary education was instituted; vagrancy and mandatory *cédula*, or personal identification, laws were passed; and taxes were imposed on animal slaughter. The state began carefully to scrutinize and control social deviance, particularly regarding those who may have been spreading "subversive propaganda" contrary to the Trujillo regime.⁵²

An important aspect of the impact of the U.S. occupation was that it made border inhabitants see themselves in a new way. Modernity meant in large part "looking modern"; it was a theatre in which representatives of authority, such as police, should be identified visually, by their appearance, no longer merely by their reputation in the community. Police uniforms were introduced in 1920.⁵³ The containment of the physically and mentally diseased also became an issue of official concern, as roundups took place to withdraw the insane from the streets and have them placed in their families' care, away from the public gaze. Modernity meant building roads, schools, prisons, post offices, and other edifices embodying progress, even if they were poorly attended or held little utility to a border population which largely continued to trade by foot and which sent its children to the fields rather than to school each morning. However, effective enforcement of these new routines was difficult,

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ This is from one article of the 1920 Ley de Sanidad (Calder, *Impact*, 46).

⁵² Legación Dominicana en Cabo Haitiano, Haití, Correspondencia recibida, 1935–6, Leg. 2, 2 June 1936, AGN.

⁵³ Gobernación de Monte Cristi 21 (1919–1921), 15 Mar 1920, No. 1442, AGN. This document mentions police uniforms as it refers to the need to do away with a *gallera*, or cock fight arena, in Gurabo (later renamed Restauración).

if not impossible. Distances and transport difficulties precluded most border inhabitants from attending the new schools and clinics.

Complaints of corruption proliferated, particularly in the early years of the occupation; and there is ample evidence that attempts to instill a novel public identity among newly appointed government officials achieved little more than the age-old maxim of *obedezco pero no cumplo* (or, I obey but I do not comply). For example, individuals appointed in Dajabón to police cockfights were often merely paid off by the owners of cockfight stadiums, allowing the contests to continue for days, when under the new law, they were only permitted to occur on Sundays and holidays.⁵⁴ But the transformation of public space from one inclusive of popular festivity, social marginality, and bodily filth to one defined by an exclusive bourgeois morality did elevate the self-esteem of border Dominicans to some degree, particularly for the fledgling middle classes. As Monte Cristiño said, the border was "refined" during this period and given "worth."

As the body politic was remapped, all forms of social lowness became a matter of official concern. For example, there is a striking homology in official discourse between the control of Haitians and that of farm animals in the border provinces. Legal efforts to monitor the movement of animals⁵⁵ and improve their "race" or breeding were justified on the grounds of avoiding theft.⁵⁶ However, there was no parallel increase in disputes over livestock, nor in crime or robbery. The rapid increase in the level of crime in the 1930s was primarily due to the contravention of social control legislation instituted during this period and the resistance of the majority to comply with it (the rise is in *cédula*, or identity card, violations).⁵⁷ There was no corresponding population increase or rapid expansion in economic activity that could explain this new trend. But the striking parallel between the new concern for clarifying and regulating spatial boundaries and controlling the circulation of animals and the socially marginal between rural sections and communes demonstrates a new concern for putting all categories of "social dirt" in their place and for the redefinition of a social order now based on the containment of, and separation of purity from, impurity. The modernization of the country implied the sanitation of the public sphere and the elaboration of a wealth of new taboos concerning the placement and displacement of bodily and social filth.

Given this new effort at cleansing the nation and regulating the orifices of

⁵⁴ Gobernación de Monte Cristi 21 (1919–1921), 10 Mar 1920, No. 1441, AGN.

⁵⁵ Usually pigs and chickens, the "bank accounts" of the peasantry; cattle were primarily the property of the upper strata.

⁵⁶ "La ley y el reglo sobre certificaciones para el traslado de animales, de cueros y de carnes de los mismos," applying only to those animals being sold or killed, took effect 28 Oct 1936 (Ministerio de lo Interior y Policía 1937, *Cronología*, 20 Jan 1937, AGN).

⁵⁷ Crime records do not exist for all border provinces for every year. This statement is based on a survey of all extant records from the border provinces of Barahona (1896–1925), Dajabón (1933–37, 1940) and Monte Cristi (1906, 1936, 1938–39). See, for example, Alcaldía de Dajabón, exp. penales, leg. 46–49, 51–52, AGN.

the body politic, it is not surprising that resistance to the new order involved the defilement of the new symbols of state authority. This may have resulted from the border residents' popular rejection of the new official symbolic chain which redefined the poor (themselves) as social filth. Apparently the 1933 law requiring mandatory school attendance incurred the wrath of many families, perhaps because it disrupted the agricultural cycle, particularly among poor families who depended on family labor during periods of intense agricultural activity, such as the harvest. However, the families' annoyance may equally have been due to the imposition of school fees and uniforms, as the flow of cash was tight in the border economy. Nevertheless, the particular cultural forms of protest are significant. Four Dominicans were arrested because they sent their children to school in the nude with a note saying that these children would be sent "to grade school if the principal would take them as they are—naked."⁵⁸ The same year, a Dominican woman was convicted of throwing fecal matter at the Telegraph and Post Office,⁵⁹ although the object of her grievance is not made clear in her testimony. Here, the arteries of state power, the sites embodying the new concept of public authority—the clean, white-washed school and post office—are defaced using the symbolic tools now made available by the state. The discourse of disgust was thrown back upon the icons which embodied the new moral topography of high and low, polite and vulgar, hygiene and defilement; as popular resistance deployed the language of bodily disorder to redefine the state as the prime agent of pollution.⁶⁰

Of course, not all protest took such poetic forms; but women tended to play an inordinate role in resisting novel legislation. For example, as late as 1941, the state was still having trouble inducing women to take out *cédulas*; and local authorities continued to seek a way to enforce this requirement. One might imagine that the women resisted because they were confined to domestic activities, but at least in the border, this was not the case among poor women. Indeed, the marketplace, the center of social and economic activity in the frontier, was the province of women, a space in which market women gathered to sell their wares and others came to gossip and socialize. Indeed, a large portion of crime in the 1930s in Dajabón was the result of women causing a "public scandal," which while ambiguously defined, usually entailed a scuffle between two women including mutual insults, a public fracas, and disruption of the public peace.

The wide-ranging Sanitation Law instituted by the Americans during their occupation became a focal point of popular resentment, particularly for mar-

⁵⁸ Alcaldía de Dajabón 45, Exp. 1 (January–March 1933), 19 Jan 1933, AGN.

⁵⁹ Alcaldía de Dajabón 46, Exp. 3 (June–October 1933), 29 Sept. 1933, AGN.

⁶⁰ See "The City: The Sewer, the Gaze and the Contaminating Touch" in Stallybrass and White, *Politics and Poetics*. The connection I am making here between the state project to sanitize and render visible is also made by Nicholas Thomas in his "Sanitation and Seeing: The Creation of State Power in Early Colonial Fiji," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32:1 (January 1990), 149–70.

ket women, who made in their homes the bread, sweets, and other products they sold at market. Although the law entailed a new partitioning of private space and attempted to segregate and sanitize food preparation, few peasants had proper waste disposal systems. The market women complained that officials were calling upon them to make an "impossible sacrifice," in effect, forcing them to dispense with their principal means of livelihood, since they lacked the resources to comply with the new legislation.⁶¹ Stallybrass and White's analysis of the early European fair resonates with the transformation of the frontier marketplace during the 1920s. As the European bourgeoisie sought to partition the economic sphere of activity of the public fair from its festive and playful aspects, the fair became charged as a dangerous space, due to its moral licence and the conceptual confusion caused by its mixture of "work and pleasure, trade and play."⁶² The Americans, too, apparently found that the marketplace and its hybridization of the categories of business and play, clean and dirty, Haitian and Dominican, rich and poor, was a space of confusion demanding partition, sanitation and enclosure.

ETHNICITY AND LABOR REGIMES IN THE BORDERLANDS

Some writers have portrayed the Haitian border population as arriving in the 1920s and 1930s as recent, illegal squatters on Dominican land. This position implicitly justifies Trujillo's violent solution to the "problem" of Haitian migration.⁶³ The "Haitian" population living in the Dominican border provinces, however, was already an old and well-established group in the 1930s, well integrated into the Dominican frontier economy and society. The majority were second-generation residents of the Dominican border. Family genealogies indicate that this population dated from approximately 1885 onwards in the north and from the 1850s in the central border.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Gobernación de Monty Cristi 21 (1919–21), No. 1126, 12 Feb. 1920, AGN. The report goes on to complain that "the new system implanted in the country is absolutely foreign to it's [the Dominican Republic's] idiosyncracies and laws." There were also protests over other icons of modernity, which to some were synonymous with the United States. Defending the *patria* meant keeping out roads and prisons, which were seen as unnecessarily costly, "repressive," "a great immorality" and like other aspects of the occupation must be challenged "for honor and duty" (por decoro y por deber) (Gobernación de Barahona 24 (1924–25), February 5, 1925; May 19, 1925; February 4, 1925, AGN).

⁶² Stallybrass and White, *Transgression*, 30.

⁶³ These writers argue that the Haitian *caco* guerilla war against the United States Marines during the occupation, combined with the upheaval caused by the imposition of the *corvée*, or forced labor, system and peasant land dispossessions created a new migrant stream to the Dominican border in the 1920s. See Paul R. LaTortue, "La migración haitiana a Santo Domingo," *Estudios Sociales*, 18:59 (January–March 1985), 45; and Suzy Castor, *La ocupación norteamericana de Haití y sus consecuencias 1915–1934* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI), 1971.

⁶⁴ This point is important because, by the Dominican constitution, all those born on Dominican soil are Dominican. If this population was primarily migrants, then they were Haitians, thus making it easier to justify the slaughter. However, our findings indicate that they were legally Dominicans, even if culturally defined as Haitian, since they were of Haitian origin. This statement is based on life histories collected by D. L. F. in the 1980s.

Most likely the origins of Haitian emigration to the Dominican border in the nineteenth century lay in the disparity of land tenure in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.⁶⁵ Rural Haiti, a dense matrix of small farms producing food crops for local markets, contrasted sharply with the essentially nonmarket nature of the Dominican border economy. Although it was diversifying to include agriculture in the rich central San Juan valley by the late nineteenth century, rural Dominican Republic was still predominantly an open, underpopulated ranching economy based on easy access to state lands. Due to land redistribution through agrarian reform and to the post-independence Haitian governments's practice of land gifts in exchange for political support, Haitian state lands had been gradually dispersed during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, towards the end of that century, Haitian leaders attempted to foment smallholder agriculture on the assumption that land ownership strengthened patriotism. The tendency towards *minifundismo* was compounded by the inheritance pattern of the Napoleonic Code, in which heirs were allotted equal portions of property in land.⁶⁶ Haiti was also much more densely populated than the Dominican Republic in the nineteenth century, with eight times more people per square kilometer than its eastern neighbor and half the land mass in 1822.⁶⁷

In contrast, much of the terrain in the northern Dominican borderlands as late as the 1930s was state land originally derived from royal land grants; and until the 1930s this terrain remained a *zona de crianza*, or ranching priority zone.⁶⁸ The designation of a ranching priority proved a disincentive for agriculture because farmers were responsible for fencing, which was costly for smallholders. The central and southern regions were for the most part *terrenos comuneros*, which were undivided land tracts owned by groups of individuals. The allotment of these tracts was represented by shares or other units of value (such as *acciones* or *pesos*). Common shares could also be purchased for usufruct and wood gathering, as these rights were kept distinct.⁶⁹ The

the Haitian *escapains*, or survivors, of the 1937 massacre. In the North, these colonies lie between Ouanaminthe and Cap-Haïtien and include Dosmont, Terrier Rouge, and Grand Bassin. In southern Haiti, we interviewed in Port-au-Prince, Thiote, and Savane Zombi. Palmer reports that the cemetery of Macasia has Haitian gravestones from the mid-nineteenth century (Palmer, "Land Use," 101).

⁶⁵ I am here diverging from the standard Dominican literature which gives primacy to the "overpopulation" of Haiti in explaining Haitian migration to the Dominican border provinces (for example, Joaquín Balaguer, *La isla al revés: Haití y el destino Dominicano* [Santo Domingo: Libre Dominicana, 1987]). For more on Haitian land tenure, see Suzy Castor, "Algunas consideraciones sobre la estructura agraria de una sociedad postesclavista: el caso de Saint Domingue," *Avances de Investigación*, 29 (Mexico: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, 1978).

⁶⁶ Palmer, "Land Use," 71.

⁶⁷ Box and de la Rive, "Sociedad fronteriza," 52.

⁶⁸ Our interviews indicate that much of the northern border lands were state lands, with a higher proportion of *terrenos comuneros* (communal lands) in the central and southern regions (from Loma de Cabrera southward).

⁶⁹ The United States Government was confounded by the "peculiar" system of communal lands (see the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry to Santo Domingo* [Washington: Government

occupants' right to the land was good as long as he did not leave it fallow or abandon his house for more than a year. Property of the *ayuntamiento* was also often held in common. Sometimes it was rented or even given away. In 1871, an estimated one-fourth to one-third of all territory in the Dominican Republic was public land.⁷⁰ Not only the existence of state lands but also the separation of property forms made for a range of opportunities for the peasantry unavailable in Haiti.

Although official Dominican discourse claims that the Haitian border population were squatters, many Haitians actually did hold legal title to their property.⁷¹ However, given the access to land, low demographic density, and the predominant practice of state land use in the Dominican Republic, most residents—Haitian or Dominican—did not hold legal title, but this does not seem to have been a problem. Only the wealthiest cattle-ranching families, such as the Carrascos and the Corderos of Dajabón, who each held herds of 100 to 200 head in the 1930s, bothered to purchase rights (*derechos* or *acciones*) for the state lands they utilized. And even these families used the public common grazing lands for pasture. The Diaz family, the most affluent family in Santiago de Cruz (on the outskirts of Dajabón) in the 1930s, bought shares for 2,300 acres of state land around the turn of the century. This enabled them to enclose communal lands. In the south, wealthy Haitian ranchers grazed their cattle across the borderline on Dominican terrain; and Dominican ranchers frequently kept herds on the Haitian side of the border to avoid export duties.⁷²

Notions of Haitian–Dominican difference were related to the way in which Haitians were inserted in the regional border economies, which roughly divide into two distinct ecological and economic zones. The north-

en la República Dominicana," *Eme Eme: Estudios Dominicanos*, 9:51 (November–December) 1980, 5–46; Marlin D. Clausner, *Rural Santo Domingo* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), 121–24; and Frank Moya Pons, "The Land Question in Haiti and Santo Domingo: The Sociopolitical Context of the Transition from Slavery to Free Labor, 1801–1843," in *Between Slavery and Free Labor: The Spanish-Speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century*, Manuel Moreno Fraginals et al., eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 181–214. For Spanish parallels, see David E. Vassberg, *Land and Society in Golden Age Castile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

⁷⁰ H. Hoetink, *The Dominican People 1850–1900: Notes for a Historical Sociology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 4.

⁷¹ See the Libro de Registro de Actos Judiciales "B" 1929 (1929–1949), Archives of the Ayuntamiento, Dajabón. These documents record numerous legal property transfers to Haitians (both those born in the Dominican Republic and in Haiti). Interestingly, we found land claims as late as the 1940s by Haitians in Haiti trying to reclaim land to which they held title but lost when forced to flee the Dominican Republic during the 1937 Haitian massacre. From the scant information available, it appears that the *terrenos comuneros* form of ownership was a uniquely Dominican practice, particularly as, over time, shares were frequently sold out of the family. The Haitian system of communal land tenancy, the *lakou*, was family based and was practiced on Dominican soil, for example in the mountainous central frontier. We have no evidence of ethnic mixing in these two land tenure systems.

⁷² Interview, Pedernales, Dominican Republic; Palmer, "Land Use," 103.

ern region surrounding Dajabón, comprised largely of semiarid savanna, had sufficient undergrowth for cattle ranching because underpopulation permitted extensive grazing over very wide distances. A distinct zone straddled the Cordillera Central, the central mountain chain that remains virtually impassable today. Extremely isolated, the small settlements surrounding Res-tauración were closely linked to Haiti. The tiny agricultural hamlets tucked away in the mountainous slopes of this central zone were capable of cultivating a wide range of produce; and the lush, elevated terrain was perfect for coffee.

By the 1930s, a complex division of labor had developed in the more populous cattle-ranching areas of the Dominican frontier. In the regions closest to the town of Dajabón, an underclass had developed of Dominicans and Haitians who were sharecroppers for the larger cattle ranchers. Some of the Dominican middle peasants hired Haitians for day labor, paying a fixed wage for a specific job, such as building a fence or clearing a harvest. Most of the Haitians employed in this form of day work appear to have been more recent Haitian migrants. In the southern region surrounding Pedernales, an ethnic division of labor developed in the ranching areas, in which large ranchers employed Dominicans as foremen (*mayorales*) to raise cattle, sheep, or hogs in exchange for a percentage of the herd's share. These *mayorales* then employed Haitians to help as sharecroppers with the bean, corn, and coffee harvests. This ethnic division of labor was so entrenched that after the massacre, some of these middle ranchers abandoned the border and sought urban wage labor, unable to imagine cultivating crops without Haitian help.

But in most areas of the northern frontier savanna, a clearly segmented labor market based on an ethnic specialization of occupations did not develop.⁷³ Poverty in the northern border militated against a division of labor drawn rigidly along ethnic lines. Dominicans also hired out as sharecroppers or engaged in day labor when cash was needed, for example, to purchase wood for fencing. A variety of sharecropping forms were utilized, usually divided in portions of one-half or one-third of the harvest (called *a medias* or *a terceras*). A common form was to lend land out for one or two years, then have it returned either at harvest time or when the grass had regrown, when a new plot was allotted to the sharecropper. This form may have been a useful means of clearing virgin land, abundant in this area, to create land for new pastures.⁷⁴ The predominance of sharecropping in the more populous zones may underscore the nonmonetized character of Dominican agriculture. Further evidence of course is the practice of *terrenos comuneros* by which land was not subdivided, and plot boundaries were often vague and ill-defined.⁷⁵

⁷³ Unlike Tambiah's model of ethnic incorporation on the basis of labor market segmentation, see Tambiah, "Ethnic Conflict," 345.

⁷⁴ I am grateful to Richard Turits for this idea.

⁷⁵ See Frank Moya Pons, "Haiti and Santo Domingo: 1790–c. 1870," in *The Cambridge*

Haitians, however, brought to the border a very different concept of land use and property. This was evidenced most clearly in the highly rural mountainous areas of the central frontier, such as Restauración.⁷⁶ Here, a very different pattern of ethnicity arose. Dominicans lived in the lowland savannas, engaged in a mixed economy of agriculture and small-scale animal husbandry. A longstanding large community of Haitians lived in the highlands, producing primarily coffee. There were families, such as the Guerriers, who after generations of settlement, acquired large tracts of land organized in the *lakou*, a Haitian form of family tenancy.⁷⁷ Many of these families were highly successful and sold coffee in Santiago, the second largest Dominican city, far from the border. These communities also sold large quantities of produce in the Haitian markets of La Miel and Mont Organisé, as well as in Dominican markets. A similar Haitian community resided in the hills of the mountainous zone above Pedernales, the Sierra del Baoruco.

Today the dominant image of Haitians in the Dominican Republic is the indigent cane cutter because Haitians after the turn of the century have been employed as contract laborers in the sugar industry. Haitian cane cutters, viewed with loathing and disgust, are perceived as diseased, smelly savages.⁷⁸ For this reason, many observers simplistically conflate anti-Haitianism with racism, assuming that it is an essentially class-based prejudice reinforced by a somatic-cum-national notion of difference. However, this stereotype of class baseness was not predominant in the border communities. Attitudes towards Haitians should be analytically separated into two sets of associations because Haiti, to Dominicans, signifies both another country, and

History of Latin America, vol. III, Leslie Bethell ed. (New York: Cambridge, 1985), 257; and Bruce Calder, *The Impact of Intervention*, 102.

⁷⁶ Restauración, called Gurabo Haitiano in the 1930s, remains Gurabo to the older residents of the area today. It was renamed Restauración in the 1940s, after the 1865 Independence War of the Restoration against the Spanish. A nationalist monument was also constructed on the mountain overlooking the town. (The Trujillo regime built monuments in other areas of the border as well. A large obelisk marks the entry to Dajabón, for example.) As part of the nationalist, anti-Haitian thrust of the Trujillo regime after the massacre, many border communities were renamed so as to erase the memory of the Haitian presence and symbolically integrate these areas into the Dominican nation, such as Tête à L'Eau, which was renamed Cabeza de Agua; L'Eau Noir became Aguas Negras; and Bananes, Banano. This attempt to rewrite history was not entirely a success, however, as many border residents continue to call these townships by their older names. And the obelisk in Dajabón has lost its original significance. People today say it is a fetish protecting the town from *vodoun*.

⁷⁷ For more on the Haitian *lakou*, see Serge Larose, "The Haitian Lakou: Land, Family and Ritual," in A. F. Marks and R. A. Romer, eds., *Family and Kinship in Middle America and the Caribbean* (Leiden: University of the Netherlands Antilles and the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology, 1978), 482-512.

⁷⁸ However, these stereotypes tend to be directed at the Haitian cane cutter in the abstract; most Dominicans who live and work in the sugar sector do not share this view. See Frank Moya Pons et al., *El Batey: estudio socioeconómico de los bateyes del Consejo Estatal del Azúcar* (Santo Domingo: Fondo Para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales, 1986), 130.

another ethnic group or *raza* (in the Spanish sense of nation or people) residing in the Dominican Republic.

Along either one of these axes, border Dominicans did not hold an univocal set of negative stereotypes related to Haiti and Haitians. Most of the Dominican border residents visited Haiti frequently. Before the "Dominicanization"⁷⁹ of the frontier zones of the 1940s, these border residents perceived the Haitian border towns as more opulent than the corresponding Dominican sister towns. In the collective memory of the border people, the Haitian elite was more refined and lived in higher style and in more elegant houses than Dominicans, particularly in Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien, the largest Haitian cities frequently visited by Dominicans. The Haitian border towns were considered more active in economic terms, with larger markets and more imported goods.⁸⁰ To a population of sharecroppers who for the most part built their own rural homesteads (*bohios*) using hay and cane shards for roofing, the French colonial architecture of the Haitian towns, with the large churches and the predominance of tin roofs topping Haitian peasant huts, was impressive, reminiscent of a forgotten colonial history of grandeur. In contrast, the Dominican border towns had no municipal offices or churches until the 1920s and 1930s. People say Dajabón had only one good house (*casa buena*), a store. The simple church had a cane roof and a mud floor. Many Haitian residents of Dajabón sent their children to the Jesuit L'École des Frères primary school run by French priests in neighboring Ouanaminthe each day, while the Dominican schools were much simpler affairs, understaffed and organized only through the fourth grade. These minute status differentials combined to form an idea of Haitian distinction, an image of Haiti as somehow being above the Dominican Republic.

The logic of fictive kinship ties, or *compadrazgo*, in the Dominican frontier, however, indicates a hierarchical ethnic structure unseen in land tenure patterns. As in much of Latin America, the system of godparentage was dual. Families gave their children two sets of *compadres*, those of first waters (*primeras aguas*) and those of Church baptism. The function of the second set was primarily political and economic; these *compadres* are seen quite patently as an economic and political resource, providing a link to figures of authority

⁷⁹ After the massacre, Trujillo called for the "Dominicanization" of the frontier which entailed building schools, churches, colonies and military posts along the border as well as white immigration to finalize the process of defining the border (which began with the 1936 border treaty and the 1937 Haitian massacre). On the policy of "Dominicanization," see Roorda, "Genocide;" and Vega, *Trujillo y Haití*. Peña Battle was responsible for revaluing the frontier from a territorial issue to one of the organic unity of the nation (see Raymundo González, "Peña Battle").

⁸⁰ Even today Haitians are perceived to "monopolize" in the Dominican Republic the highly valued black market product of imported French perfumes, which hold far higher status than the cheap American colognes readily available legally. Working-class Dominican men, particularly those of the *barrios* surrounding Santo Domingo, will pay Haitian market women exorbitant prices to secure the perfumes for themselves and their girlfriends.

in the community, thus political protection, or economic assistance in times of need.⁸¹ Haitians and Dominicans alike in the border communities sought out powerful Dominican caudillos as godparents, such as the renowned Chicho Ventura of Dajabón. Ventura appears to have been a godfather for nearly every child born to poorer peasants in the area and continues to be so today. Poor compadres pay a high price for their symbolic links to individuals of more secure economic status, however, as they may be called upon to work on the latter's estates.⁸²

Yet even if those signifying formal political authority were predominantly Dominican, the urban elite class of the border towns included many Haitians. Until the 1930s, the only doctor in Dajabón was a well-educated Haitian from Port-au-Prince; and a Haitian exile on the outskirts of the town, Mr. Dosèn, was a large rancher and sold grain alcohol and molasses made from his ox-driven sugar mill at market. One of the most prominent characters in the southern border was a powerful businesswoman living in Anse-à-pitre, just over the border, who played a central role in the community of Pedernales due to her part-time occupation as moneylender. Certain urban occupations became ethnically encoded as Haitian, such as domestic work, selling at market and shoemaking. This is particularly significant because it underscores the fact that anti-Haitianism in the border was not merely a class prejudice.

Haitians and Dominicans brought two distinct structures of kinship to border society, and these combined to produce a family form distinct from either society. As R. T. Smith has argued, the "dual marriage system" arose during slavery in the West Indies as a result of the colonial European practice of simultaneous marriage to a status equal and of concubinage with status inferiors, in which the mistress performed all wifely duties, save that of "presiding at table."⁸³ The practice of maintaining co-wives or concubines is widespread in the Dominican Republic and is a sign of male prestige and power, as is fathering many children, which is often accomplished on the basis of serial (rather than simultaneous) common-law wives. However, this must be done in secrecy with the knowledge of only a small circle (usually only of men), as the honor of the family is tainted if the practice of keeping concubines out of wedlock is flaunted in the community.

⁸¹ The link was sought perhaps out of terror. Chicho, still prominent today, has been a military favorite since the 1930s of both the Trujillo and Balaguer regimes for his prowess as an assassin. This contrasts sharply with the work of Paul Friedrich, who demonstrates that the more egalitarian Tarascan Indian villagers did not seek out rich or powerful compadres to form vertical links but, rather, sought ties which bound political blocks together horizontally. See his *The Princes of Naranja: An Essay in Anthrohistorical Method* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 108–14. I would like to thank Paul Liffman for bringing this point to my attention.

⁸² F. P. Ducoudray, "Los compadres en la frontera," *Ahora!*, 858 (5 May 1980), 14.

⁸³ R. T. Smith, "Hierarchy and the Dual Marriage System in West Indian Society," in *Gender and Kinship: Essays Toward a Unified Analysis*, Jane Fishburne Collier and Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, eds. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 163–96.

In the cattle-ranching areas of the border, however, the practice of keeping multiple spouses was common and relatively open. The Dominican husband had a primary Dominican wife, along with one or more Haitian co-wives, who maintained their own homestead near a plot of land which they farmed for their husband.⁸⁴ Only the more affluent middle ranchers kept their co-wives spatially separate, with their first wife presiding over the town household and the others living in the fields; and a modicum of discretion was maintained about these relationships. In more rural zones, the Dominican and Haitian wives lived in close proximity; and the husband rotated among them on an organized schedule. In a few cases a single household unit was formed, and the Dominican and Haitian wives cooked and cared for the children together. This multiple household strategy bears a strong resemblance to the Haitian *plasaj*, an informal conjugal union.⁸⁵

This household form may well have developed as a social and economic strategy to accommodate the exigencies of ranching. As ranchers spent the entire week away from their primary households, their Haitian co-wife or wives cooked for them and provided emotional support while they were in the field, farming the ranchers' plots while they tended the cattle. However, this practice existed not only among ranchers but also among urban households, as well as peasant cultivators, in the Dominican border.⁸⁶ Due to the lack of ecclesiastical and municipal services in these areas until the 1930s, there was no stigma attached to common-law marriage, which formed the majority of conjugal unions. In most cases, however, only the Dominican wife is defined as a wife, thus the Haitian co-wives are accorded a secondary status. This conjugal form, primarily Dominican men with Haitian women, indicates power inequality between the two ethnic groups and, indeed, was perceived as

⁸⁴ A crucial issue is what share of the harvest Haitian co-wives were allotted, but this will have to await further research.

⁸⁵ See Ira P. Lowenthal, "Labor, Sexuality and the Conjugal Contract in Rural Haiti," in *Haiti—Today and Tomorrow: An Interdisciplinary Study*, Charles R. Foster and Albert Valdman, eds. (New York: University Press of America, 1984), 15–33; and George Eaton Simpson, "Sexual and Familial Institutions in Northern Haiti," *American Anthropologist* (New series), 44:4 (October–December 1942), Part I: 655–74.

⁸⁶ A crucial issue is whether these Haitian–Dominican households inherited on the basis of Dominican or Haitian patterns, as Haitian families apportioned inherited land on an individual basis, on an equal basis among all siblings (thus women owned their own property); while Dominicans appear to have given priority to the first son, or sons (if the wife of the patriarch was deceased), and family land was inherited as an undivided unit of communal property. The issue of whether or not Haitian co-wives inherited the land they worked is also one which we hope to clarify in future field work. The pattern of inheritance is critical to Goody's distinction between co-wives and concubines. I am using the term "co-wife" because my understanding is that co-wives did inherit, as in Haitian *plasaj*. This would distinguish the border conjugal system from that of concubinage, the form practiced in wider Dominican society. See Jack Goody, *Production and Reproduction: A Comparative Study of the Domestic Domains* (London: Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, 1976).

such because multiple wives and many children were important markers of distinction within the community.⁸⁷

HAITIANS, MAGIC, AND MONEY

A close examination of the many ways in which Haitians were inserted into the various Dominican border economies⁸⁸ demonstrates that the Haitians held far from a marginal economic status. They constituted the very center of economic life in these communities. In many ways, Haitians seemed to have represented value itself. In a predominantly barter economy, they were associated both with the production of value and the circulation of money, as Haitian currency was the primary unit of exchange in the border provinces until 1947.⁸⁹ This corresponds with the two most visible economic roles of Haitians in the Dominican border economy, that of the Haitian market woman and the moneylender, as well as the common invisible role, the co-wife who tends the *conuco* (garden plot). Not coincidentally, all these Haitian personae embodying value are female, giving them the added valence of fertility and reproduction. The idea of Haitians as signifying value may have been reinforced as well in the difference between the economic roles assigned to women and men in Haitian and Dominican border society. Haitian women were perceived as controlling the household economy; while in Dominican society, the patriarch, as household head, controlled the distribution of domestic resources. In the ideal Dominican household, the wife maintained the private sphere and withdrew from cultivation or employment. This notion contrasted sharply with the centrality of the Haitian female in economic terms. She produced an independent income, controlled the family earnings, and passed on wealth independently of her husband through inheritance.

The symbolic link between Haitians and wealth—both in money and commodities—also articulates with the fact that Haitians produced most of the agriculture circulating in the Dominican border provinces, forming the basis of the local economy, because they were the majority. Dominicans were associated with pastoralism, the product of which was primarily exported. A

⁸⁷ We heard of a few examples of Haitian men marrying Dominican women, although there were many Dominican prostitutes in Haitian bordertowns. There also were Haitian-Dominican marriages, primarily of small cultivators and coffee producers, which were monogamic. One such couple we interviewed fled to Haiti during the Haitian massacre.

⁸⁸ This section derives primarily from interviews we conducted during a series of visits to the Dominican border in 1988, including Monte Cristi, Dajabón, Santiago de la Cruz, Loma de Cabrera, Restauración, Pedro Santana, Pedernales, Duvergé, Neiba, and Barahona (we also interviewed in Haiti but that material is treated elsewhere). All the interviewees chosen were mature at the time of the massacre in an effort to capture images of Haitians formed during the pre-massacre period. I have not cited specific interviews (except in a few cases in which the stories were specific to particular oral informants) both to protect the identity of informants and because the images reported here derive from stories that all elderly border residents repeat and that form a part of the collective imagination of the Dominican frontier.

⁸⁹ Haitian currency and the U.S. dollar were used until the Dominican Republic established its first national currency in 1947, although there was a brief but failed attempt to do so under the Heureaux regime. However, Haitian currency was more common in the border provinces.

common cliché, indeed the primary motif of ethnic difference in the border, was that Dominicans "lived off" Haitians because Haitians were so productive and because Dominicans were lazy and did not like to work. Thus, Haitians were associated not only with money and the sphere of circulation but with the very production of use value itself.⁹⁰

The idea of Haitians as emblematic of value was the primary motif of ethnicity in the border communities, not only in strictly economic terms but in religious terms as well. Through their command of vodoun, Haitians were construed as holding a monopoly on the sacred and access to it. Vodoun was an esoteric knowledge and science which only Haitians practiced but which Dominicans also highly esteemed. While Dominicans participated in the popular rituals of vodoun and frequently sought out vodoun priests for their curative powers, amulets, and blessings, they defined it as something uniquely Haitian. Only Haitians could be "mounted," or possessed, by the *lwa*, or spirits; when Dominicans did so, it was a *simulacro*, or a forgery of the real thing. The perceived secrecy of the magic of vodoun created an invisible but nonetheless real boundary between Haitians and Dominicans in the border, distinguishing the two groups from one another. Of course, secrecy itself creates value; like property, secret knowledge can be possessed. The fact of this possession then differentiates, creating a distinction between insider and outsider. As Luhrmann states, this "difference can create a hierarchy, wherein secrecy cedes social power to those who control the flow of treasured information."⁹¹

As a result of their perceived monopoly of the sacred, Haitians were treated with awe and deference in certain situations. The Haitians' command of vodoun endowed them with a form of social power that at times took priority over class distinction. This could be heard in the testimony of an elderly Dominican coffee farmer in the southern border region, who employed nineteen Haitian coffee pickers for his thirty-acre plantation. Pérez Rocha otherwise maintained strict control over his workers, assiduously cultivating ample social distance between them and himself. He carefully explained the theater he had devised to ensure that his authority was respected. For example, he used a Haitian intermediary to deal with all conflicts and a carefully orchestrated set of rituals surrounding the payment of his employees, including affecting a stern disposition, not speaking to them or expressing any semblance of emotion. But concerning their magic, he attributed seemingly unlimited powers to Haitians that enabled them to transgress the limits of rational human behavior. He said that he had once seen a Haitian, while

⁹⁰ This argument renders the Haitian-Dominican case closely parallel to that of Jews in Nazi Germany. I am indebted here to Moise Postone's article, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism," in *Germans and Jews Since the Holocaust: The Changing Situation in West Germany*, Anson Rabinbach and Jack Zipes, eds. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), 311.

⁹¹ T. M. Luhrmann, "The Magic of Secrecy," *Ethos*, 17:2 (June 1989), 137.

possessed, chew a glass bottle; then proceed to walk through a series of flames, remaining unburnt; and finally, suck the blood of a wild goat until there was not a drop left in its body. Haitian control of vodoun enabled them to access a range of mystical forces and superhuman powers, thus rendering them powerful and at times even dangerous.

The magical force to which Haitians had privileged access in the Dominican collective imagination was hidden and held, in this way, a specifically female valence. Haitians were seen as "dark, secretive, and opaque," alluring but potentially threatening.⁹² This hidden interiority, their secret access to the sacred, gave them a mystical resonance. Dominicans did have their own religious cosmology and did follow their own set of patron saints, but there were perceived limits to Dominican powers of healing and transcendence. A Dominican could be a *curandero*, a popular healer; but generally only a Haitian could be a *brujo*, or witch. This distinction is very similar to that made within Haitian vodoun between the *Rada* and *Petwo* deities: The *Rada* is the pantheon of "insiders and family"; the *Petwo* are the spirits of "outsiders and foreigners."⁹³ The gravest problems (usually romantic or financial) and illnesses were reserved in the border for the Haitian *Iwa*.

Haitian magic was especially revered for its procreativity and protective powers and its ability to generate new life. In the 1930s, many Dominicans went to Haiti to be baptized and followed the Haitian ritual calendar, taking part in pilgrimages to Haiti for the cult of Mariani.⁹⁴ Many Dominicans followed the Virgin of Carmen, defined as a specifically Haitian *misterio* (spirit, from the Haitian Kreol term *mistè*, which also connotes the mysterious and secret), made promises to her, had their children baptized by her in Haiti, and called upon her to guard their livestock and harvests. Haitian magic provided them with protective *bakas* (a kind of diabolical spirit that can transmogrify into animate beings) to help farm animals, to make the harvest

⁹² This equation of femaleness with invisibility derives from Evelyn Fox Keller, "Making Gender Visible in the Pursuit of Nature's Secrets," in *Feminist Studies/Critical Studies*, Teresa de Lauretis, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 67–77, especially 69. See also Robert Darnton, "Worker's Revolt: The Great Cat Massacre of the Rue Saint Séverin," in his *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 75–106 on the cat as a symbol evoking femininity and domesticity, as well as the hidden dangers of sexuality, witchcraft, and the taboo.

⁹³ Karen McCarthy Brown, "Systematic Remembering, Systematic Forgetting: Ogun in Haiti," in Sandra T. Barnes, *Africa's Ogun: Old World and New* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 67. Pages 66 to 70 have an excellent discussion of the difference between the *Rada* and *Petwo* spirits. George T. Simpson, however, who worked in northern Haiti, claimed that he found no distinction between the *Rada* and *Petwo* classes of Haitian *Iwa*. See his *Religious Cults of the Caribbean: Trinidad, Jamaica and Haiti* (Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1980). An outstanding source on Dominican vodú is Martha Ellen Davis, *La Otra Ciencia: el vodú dominicano como religión y medicina populares* (Santo Domingo: USAD, 1987).

⁹⁴ The Cult of Mary is common in Latin America and is generally considered a Catholic rite. However, in the Dominican border, it was called "Mariani," was defined as a Haitian religious phenomena, and followers went on pilgrimages to Haiti to worship it.

grow, or to fructify a new plot. Haitian spirits were also called upon if someone had damaged the crop and vengeance was called for. The association of fertility with Haitians was not merely a Dominican construct, however, as the ability to generate new life was essential to the Haitian notion of personhood as well. Women who die virgins in northern Haiti return to haunt the living as *dyablès*, seducing men at night; and lesbians are said to cause natural disasters such as epidemics, droughts, and earthquakes.⁹⁵ Just as Haitian magic unlocked earthly regeneration, blocked fertility was itself a curse with direct consequences.

This notion of a hidden female subterranean power associated with fertility had its dangerous side as well and evoked fear among Dominicans, partly because its secrets fell outside of their gaze. Haitian women were believed to be able to fly. Although Dominicans were what they looked like, Haitians could be many things at once. They had other identities that were hidden from the mundane gaze of Dominicans. Haitians, unlike Dominicans, could be possessed or "mounted" by the *Iwa*, violating Dominican norms of bodily discipline. Haitians could multiply themselves.⁹⁶

Haitians in the popular imagination of the border were seen as linked with not only life but death, having special powers of both reproduction and destruction. An example is *Archahie*, a sacred spot in Haiti, the source of the trade in *zonbis*.⁹⁷ In Pedernales, Dominicans said that certain types of deaths could be resurrected as *zonbis*, or living dead who walk across the Haitian border after burial, taking refuge in *Archahie*. Some said that a corpse buried too soon or children dying with their eyes open reappear, alive, in *Archahie*. Another version claims that certain *vende-gente*, or people sellers, take the dead, disinter them at midnight, and resell them and that these "corpses come alive" and reappear in *Archahie*. A particularly revealing account is that of Maria Dulcita, a contemporary retailer of the dead. She lived in Pedernales, where she was also the most successful businessperson in the town and a part-time moneylender. A story circulated in Pedernales that a man once bought a winning lottery ticket from her that started him on the road to riches (what had

⁹⁵ George Eaton Simpson, "Sexual and Familial," 668–9.

⁹⁶ Note the sexual innuendo in the very term, *montar* (Spanish) or *monte* (Haitian Kreol) for possession. Although both women and men are mounted in *vodoun*, the idea that only Haitians could be mounted reflects the female gendering of Haitians in the Dominican imagination. Haitians are notorious in the anti-Haitian literature for their extraordinary procreativity as well. See Joaquín Balaguer's *La isla al revés*, in which he describes Haitians as multiplying "like vegetables" (Balaguer was implicated in the 1937 Haitian massacre). And the sexual skills of Haitian women are a stock theme of Dominican lore.

⁹⁷ Zora Neale Hurston devotes a chapter to *Archahie* in her *Tell My Horse: Voodoo and Life in Haiti and Jamaica* (1938; New York: Harper and Row, 1990, 139–78). As she states, "*Archahie* [sic] is the most famous and the most dreaded spot in all Haiti for voodoo work. It is supposed to be the great center of the *Zombie* trade" (p. 177). For more on the *Zonbi* phenomenon, see Wade Davis, *Passage of Darkness: The Ethnobiology of the Haitian Zombie* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

really transpired was that she had given him a baka).⁹⁸ These stories reveal a symbolic equation linking Haiti, magic, women, and money which produces both a desire for their hidden generative potency and a fear of their unstable identities.

Anyone who has been poor all his life and suddenly begins to accumulate money, for no apparent explanation, is believed to be actually a zombi.⁹⁹ The sole means of obtaining sudden large amounts of cash is by selling oneself or one's kin to the vende-gente. Indeed, the presence of so many Dominican zombis floating around southern Haiti even once became the subject of a legendary border accord between the governments of François Duvalier of Haiti and Antonio Guzmán, then Dominican president. According to an account in Restauración, Duvalier called a border meeting so that he could return the Dominican zombis in 1979. People from the entire border region from Restauración southward were ecstatic and eagerly awaited the return of their lost family members and loved ones. They knew they would return because a woman had been *montado* (possessed) and the *seres*, or spirits, told her that her dead husband would be returning soon. President Guzmán did visit the border and something did transpire between him and Duvalier, but the living dead were not returned. And people in the border still talk about what might have transpired in that infelicitous meeting. Certainly the spirits did not deceive them—it must have been the presidents.¹⁰⁰

Another aspect of the value represented by Haitians was that of illegitimacy. Many of the images evoked by Haitians in the border community include not only a notion of the invisibility of the value that Haitians embodied but that it was produced from nothing. Haitian wealth, endowed with limitless fertility, reproduced like magic. Through certain exchanges, Dominicans could siphon off aspects of these reproductive powers. It was common to seek out Haitian midwives, for example. But the uncaptured, pure value produced only by Haitians had a certain charge to it. Perhaps in the moral economy of the border, the power of Haitians to make money implied the loss of something Dominican; and the only thing that was really Dominican in the border was their cattle. The accusation that Haitians were somehow behind a constant, silent drain of Dominican cattle across the border is a rumor circulated constantly in the border from the early part of this century until today,

⁹⁸ This story is fully described in F. P. Ducoudray, "Los secretos del Vodú," *Ahora!*, 854 (7 April 1980), 10. For more on the baka (bocá, in Spanish), see Davis, *La Otra Ciencia*, 111–2.

⁹⁹ For more on similar folk theories of capitalism, see Michael T. Taussig's classic *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). Associations linking the ethnic and racial Other with some form of nefarious, extrapowerful or black magic appears to be common in plural societies. For example, Nancie L. González reports that Hondurans believe that the economic success of Arab immigrants is due to pacts with the devil. See her "The Christian Palestinians of Honduras: An Uneasy Accommodation," in *Conflict, Migration and the Expression of Ethnicity*, Nancie L. González and Carolyn S. McCombs, eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 79.

¹⁰⁰ Ducoudray, "Secretos del Vodú," 10.

even though many border residents agree that the claim that Haitians were constantly stealing Dominican goods was not true. There is no archival evidence supporting this assertion, yet the charge continues to circulate nonetheless. Why?

The answer may lie in part in the social construction of race in these border societies. Although the European imagination makes a fetish of skin color, measuring it in minute degrees of tonality as the primary index of racial alterity, Dominicans and Haitians define their difference from one another through a wide range of bodily practices, including eating, procreating, washing, walking, sitting, and speaking (accent). Haitian women did not cover their breasts when they washed, as Dominican women did; also, Haitian women squatted at the market, exposing their knees, a posture loath to a Dominican woman. Haitians can not speak the rolled Spanish "r", pronouncing "l" instead. Raza was not primarily marked by skin color; indeed, this marker would have been a most ambiguous signifier in a zone which had seen four hundred years of extensive intermarriage and cultural mixing. Yet there was a difference, universally acknowledged in the border, between Dominicans and Haitians. The question of whether or not they had been born on Dominican soil was not an issue; this was neither a territorially nor biologically based concept.¹⁰¹ A Dominican could become Haitianized if he lived in Haiti long enough that his speech, bodily movements, and way of life were affected.

An extension of this embodied notion of race is that the objects Haitians produced held a certain valence that those of Dominicans did not.¹⁰² The very boundaries of the Dominican body were different: Dominican bodies were closed, orderly, and domesticated, the bodies of the civilized. In contrast, Haitians had "carnival bodies" which stress their orifices and organs, their fertility, over their upper regions, which connote reason and control.¹⁰³ Haitian bodies were porous, open, and seemed to seep onto whatever they touched, especially onto what they produced. This resonates in the stories we heard about the Haitian objects left behind after the massacre, which are striking in their expression of the idea that even after the Haitians had physically departed, their property remained their own. As Blanc Tavares of Loma de Cabrera told us,

My father used to say to me, "Be very careful in buying old, cheap livestock taken from that Haitian harvest. Leave the ball to roll to each as his liking, but don't you get

¹⁰¹ Occasionally an elderly border Dominican will mention that Haitians are darker in skin color, but this is rarely a primary motif of difference. A more common biological trait noted is that Haitians have small ears.

¹⁰² This is similar to Stanley Tambiah's argument about the "objectification of charisma" in amulets. See his *The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

¹⁰³ Stallybrass and White, *Politics and Poetics*, 9; Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his World*, 20–25.

and let it loose in your backyard, because that will cast an evil spell on your house and your yard because those things are of others' sweat."

Here the Haitian body, and its excretions, inscribed the very terrain in which they lived, even their objects. Haitians seemingly possessed things in a way that Dominicans did not: The property of Haitians became not only theirs but a part of themselves. Unlike that of Dominicans, the Haitian body was not hermetically sealed. Haitian bodily boundaries extended into the world, their sweat suffusing their objects, their objects becoming their sweat. Haitian value seeped into their produce, their livestock, and thus into the marketplace. This may be the logic expressed when Dominicans told us that "Haitians were everywhere, that they had taken over." As Knauff put it, "those whose food you consume are those whose labor, land and essence constitute your own being."¹⁰⁴ Indeed, in the borderlands, if the food one produces is one's own, the Haitians were indeed everywhere; and Dominicans were both dependent on the Haitians' procreative powers and their productive potential.

Evelina Sánchez's story about the house of a Haitian market woman living in Monte Cristi during the massacre evokes this same idea about the power of the Haitian touch and the nature of Haitian value; its embeddedness; and its silent, hidden quality. Called *La Satánica* in popular parlance, the small, wooden frame house with a dirt floor was once the dream of a very successful Haitian market woman named Mancia, who was abducted by the Dominican *guardia* during the massacre.

This Haitian was very interested in getting together enough money to redo her house (you know that Haitians are very conservative with their money, very economical). You see this person that looks so poor, but they have their money hidden away. And so this Haitian would go to the market and like that kept storing away cash, until she had a nice amount stowed away, so the neighbors tell me. So when they went to get her the day of the massacre, she took out her cache that she wanted to take with her, and then the guardia said, "You're going to bring that money? You don't have to bring anything, give that to me." And she says, "no, this is my sweat!" But she screamed alot because this was her accumulated treasure, then she said "I want no one to live in this house; just as I couldn't do it, no one will rebuild this house!" We call it *La Satánica* because everyone that moved in there didn't stay there . . . from then on the house was never finished and people say that the Haitian had put a curse on the house.

This story invokes several motifs of Haitian alterity: the curious half-life of the objects produced by Haitian sweat; the hidden interior powers of Haitians; and the concealed value of these objects, here both in Mancia's money and in the curse she leaves on the house. This story expresses the danger of Haitian objects when ripped apart from their owners: Haitian goods without the controlling force of the Haitians themselves not only dance on their own but can bring danger to those who try to repossess them. The idea of

¹⁰⁴ Bruce M. Knauff, "Bodily Images in Melanesia: Cultural Substances and Natural Metaphors," in *Fragments for a History of the Human Body*, Part III, Michael Feher ed. (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 223.

the concealed value of Haitians equates money and magic in a powerful way in this passage. Indeed, in the predominantly non-commoditized border economy, Haitians came to represent the impinging market and Dominican fears of a value cut loose from the social relations that produced it. This myth links Dominican fears of money and their fears of Haitian vodoun: Both were exterior to Dominicans and lay outside their control.

There are many border stories coupling Haitians with money, magic, and blood. Dominicans said that the Haitian spirits, the lwa, can tell you the winning lottery number. Also, a prominent trope expressing the fact that Haitians were omnipresent, a presence touching every corner of the border before the massacre (and supposedly the reason why Trujillo had to kill them), was that Haitian money "ran" as far inland as Santiago, the second Dominican city, far into the interior. Finally, as stated above, the dominant Haitian stereotypes in the Dominican border were the moneylender and the market woman, both female and both highly capitalized figures in the non-market border economy. The imagery linking blood and money was not only a Dominican construct, however. Certain Haitian Petwo ceremonies require combining, then drinking, a mixture of gold coins with the blood of sacrificial animals.¹⁰⁵ The value which Haitians embodied was obscene because it represented pure exchange; antithetical to the natural economy of the border, Haitians were linked to usury, their money appearing to grow on trees.

A prominent theme in the stories Dominicans tell about Haitians then is the peculiar fact that although they looked poor, Haitians were rich and stingy.¹⁰⁶ They accumulated cash and stored it away; they did not allow it to circulate in the economy of reciprocal exchanges and gifts upon which poor Dominicans in the sharecropping underclass depended. There seemed to be a deep unease among Dominicans about the money that Haitians hid away in their houses and did not share. This might have reflected the fear that while Haitians were an integral part of the Dominican border society, intermarrying, being compadres, and working together, Haitians made money but Dominicans did not. This formed an image of Haitians accumulating wealth, while it seemed to slip out of the Dominicans' hands. There was a certain magic to Haitian money that Dominicans could not share. Dominican's fears of the marketplace, its competition and risks may have been expressed in their fears of Haitians. Haitians represented precisely the unbridled procreative power of

¹⁰⁵ Hurston, *Tell My Horse*, 171. The particular rite she describes was for the consecration of a new Ounfrò, or vodoun, temple. For a rich treatment of blood and money symbolism in another context, see Fernando Coronil, "The Black El Dorado: Money Fétishism, Democracy, and Capitalism in Venezuela" (Ph.D. disser., Anthropology Department, University of Chicago, 1987).

¹⁰⁶ The idea of the Other as stingy also appears to be a common trope of difference. See González, "Christian Palestinians," 80. Brackette Williams writes that Guyanese of African descent often believe that the seemingly impoverished Portuguese or East Indians have a hidden cache of funds saved away for future use. See her *Stains on My Name, War in My Veins: Guyana and the Politics of Cultural Struggle* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 173.

money at that moment, when the money economy was beginning to penetrate the borderlands.

This is not to say that, in the world of the 1930s, the Dominican border economies were on the verge of a capitalist revolution. They clearly were not. But the creeping arm of the state was beginning to open the way for the full-scale commodification of the border economies. This process began in 1907, as Haitian-Dominican trade was integrated into national economic markets with the first effective collection of customs at the border. This process was deepened in the 1920s during the American occupation, when a new boundary was forged between the public and private, implying that the barrier between market and home was disintegrating.¹⁰⁷ The Americans began to chip away at some of the bases of traditional forms of non-commoditized agricultural production, such as the communal lands. In this chain of signification, Dominicans represented "home," a traditional economy of scarcity and a society based on a web of reciprocal exchanges and gifts. Home also implied, of course, an orderly domestic space, with a Dominican wife who kept table and kept out of the market place or the public domain. Haitians came to represent the market but not a spatially sealed, domesticated market. Haitians came to represent a market force, the power of money that reproduced on its own, and was wildly procreative and reliant on the secrets of vodoun. To make matters worse, the market economy of Haitians was fundamentally disordered, as it was controlled by women. This mixed up the gendered order of public and private spaces in Dominican terms. Indeed, this particular association of women with money made Haitian cash appear to reproduce like magic, linking flows of blood, sexuality, and fertility with the flows of cash in a way that Dominicans saw as fundamentally obscene.

An added level of signification, of course, to this transformation was the fact that state formation was accompanied by a new set of natural metaphors which created a purified public space by defining the popular as transgressive, dangerous, and in need of expurgation. The elevation of the public was achieved by debasing the popular, as the new social order was built on eliminating the socially hybrid. State formation entailed cleansing the public sphere, bathing it in the light of modernity, and enshrining it in clean white-washed schools and post offices; the new public sphere was also one defined as purely Dominican. The new discourse of sanitation labeled the formerly popular sphere, particularly the market, as a space of dirt, disorder, and human refuse, and essentialized all forms of social lowness through the new moral order of hygiene. Policing the purity of the race, now defined in national terms, became a means of protecting the boundaries of the body politic. The Haitians would become the scapegoats in this new attack.

¹⁰⁷ See Thomas W. Laqueur, "The Social Evil, The Solitary Vice and Pouring Tea," in *Fragments For a History of the Human Body*, Part III, Michael Feher, ed. (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 340.

Closing the Dominican frontier not only altered the meaning of things Haitian but transformed the identity of border Dominicans. As they became citizens, included in the nation, these Dominicans were elevated from their previous role as debased outsiders, representative of barbarism. The transformation of the border question from simply one of territorial limits to that of a privileged site defining Dominican collective nationality and destiny placed border Dominicans in the vanguard of the national project. They could not help but be flattered by their new national strategic importance. As a result of the massacre, border Dominican men became *machos* enlisted to protect their national home from the Haitian menace.¹⁰⁸ The gendering of Haitians as female in this epic tale may account for the stories we heard of the ritual gouging of female wombs during the massacre. Indeed, the majority of massacre victims were women and children.

Racial ideologies, even in the West, are a form of fetishism. A set of unequal relationships between groups is essentialized and concealed by a system of signs emblematic of racial difference. Racism, a process in which "an idealized part is taken for the whole," subsumes the Other's subjectivity by transforming him or her into a racialized object.¹⁰⁹ In this metonymy, color is taken as a sign of the group's inequality and the reason for their lack of advancement in the social order. In the Dominican imagination, a chain of signification linking Haitians, their magic, and their money served to mark them as different and endowed both them and their products with social power. Haitians came to be seen as the embodiment of the fiery Petwo spirits, the quintessential strangers who are associated with slavery, danger, money, power, and the unbridled pursuit of self interest.¹¹⁰ The notion of race here was different from the anglophone world's because these qualities were not seen as passed genealogically. Race here was fundamentally a cultural construct in the sense that these traits were seen as passed through socialization (however, blood was a part of the symbolism of race, since Haitians were associated with sacrificial bloodletting). If Haitians were seen as different because of their magical powers, state formation, which imbued all liminal groups with a dangerous valence, only increased this perception, as race and magic became mutually constitutive and doubly entwined.

Of course, there remains a final chapter to this story, the 1937 Haitian massacre, which remains outside the reach of this essay. What I hope to have

¹⁰⁸ Alonso argues this for the northern Mexican frontier community of Namiqipa, Chihuahua. See Ana María Alonso, "Constitution of Subjects" for a highly suggestive treatment of popular nationalist ideology and gender.

¹⁰⁹ David Theo Goldberg, "Racial Knowledge," from his *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1993).

¹¹⁰ Brown, "Remembering," 68. I am clearly indebted to Taussig's *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism* here; one key difference, however, is that in Dominican and Haitian border culture, the petro spirits are not glossed as the devil in the Christian sense. They are seen as highly dangerous but not necessarily evil.

suggested is how a remapping of affines and blood kin, public and private, market and home, filth and purity and exchange value and use value may have served to lay the groundwork for a new conceptualization of what was called the Haitian problem and, thus, of race, in the Dominican border. The final displacement in this symbolic chain took place in the capital, where a need to "clean" the border was translated into one of reinstating a national boundary daily traversed by Haitians and Dominicans alike. There was a link between popular grievances and the state's desire to redefine the national boundary in a new way. Nevertheless, the state appropriated the anxieties of border Dominicans and used them for its own purposes. Ripped from their original meanings, these complaints—that Haitians were penetrating the Dominican culture and economy, that Haitians were stealing cattle, that the Haitian presence was running amok in the Dominicans' everyday life—came to represent the Dominicans' fears that Haitian value and procreative power were sucking the very blood of life from the Dominican nation. These anxieties became the excuses for a new territorialization of state control effected when the border was "rewritten" through the massacre of Haitian frontier population. However, during the bloodbath of 1937, the border lost the Haitians, but not their magic.

Comparative Studies in Society and History is a forum for presentation and discussion of new research into problems of change and stability that recur in human societies through time or in the contemporary world. It sets up a working alliance between specialists in all branches of the social sciences and humanities. Debate and review articles bring the general reader in touch with current findings and issues.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Contributions may be descriptive, analytical, or theoretical. Any article not in itself comparative may be accepted if it lends itself to comment that will place it in comparative perspective. Correspondence with the editors prior to the submission of articles will help to enable them to obtain such comment or a companion study. Emphasis in comparative studies may be either on similarities or, if these are significant enough and call for some recasting of generalizations, on differences. All contributions and editorial correspondence should be sent to the Editors, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 102 Rackham Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1070.

Two copies of each contribution, preferably accompanied by a stamped, addressed envelope, should be submitted. Both text and footnotes should be clearly typed with double spacing and wide margins; footnotes should appear on separate pages at the end of the article. Illustrations may be included by arrangement with the editors.

Copyright © 1994 Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, electronic, photocopying or otherwise, without permission in writing from Cambridge University Press. Photocopying information for users in the U.S.A.: The Item-Fee Code for this publication (0010-4175/94 \$5.00 + .00) indicates that copying for internal or personal use beyond that permitted by Sec. 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law is authorized for users duly registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transaction Reporting Service, provided that the appropriate remittance of \$5.00 per article is paid directly to: CCC, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. Specific written permission must be obtained for all other copying. Contact the ISI Tearsheet Service, 3501 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, for single copies of separate articles.